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Abstract
St. Louis County, Missouri is a fragmented suburban area, covering
505 square miles, with ninety separate municipalities. Fifty-six municipalities
maintain in-house police departments, while thirty-four contract police
services from other governments. Previous research concerning
interjurisdictional collaboration efforts has been rooted in the rational choice
theory. However, the rational choice theory alone does not explain why some
municipalities do or do not enter into contracts for police services. The
purpose of this work is to examine police contracting decisions in St. Louis
County, specifically the drivers behind contracting discussions and decisions
in five sample municipalities in St. Louis County. The five case studies were
examined utilizing theories from the policy process literature, namely
focusing events and changes in image and venue. Decisions were also
examined utilizing Wilson’s typology of police styles. Of the case studies that
resulted in a police contract, a change in both venue and image occurred. In
the case studies that did not result in a police contract, a change in image and
venue related to matters of policing did not occur. Therefore, it was
determined that changes in image and venue as well as a focusing event on
police were necessary for successful decisions to contract police services.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
St. Louis County is a patchwork of municipalities that, like a true
patchwork quilt, vary in shape, size, and community fabric. Despite the
differences in these municipalities, each community strives to protect its
citizens through police services. The way in which these municipalities
provide police services is just as much of a patchwork as the myriad of
municipalities. Some municipalities maintain their own police departments
while others contract police services from the County or another
municipality. The purpose of this work is to examine police contracting
decisions in St. Louis County, specifically, the drivers behind contracting
discussions and decisions in five sample municipalities in St. Louis County.
The question of contracting decisions touches on matters of efficiency, policecommunity relations, as well as justice and fairness.
Agreements between governments may be made informally, through
formalized networks, voluntarily created, or mandated by an outside party.
Mandated agreements may be required by legislative bodies. In St. Louis
County, contractual agreements for police services are formal agreements
created voluntarily between governments. Formal agreements have been
described as “transactions that require financial transfers [that are]
usually…formalized in order to protect property rights of the participating
governments” (Andrew 2009, 134). Legally binding agreements are
important to delineate responsibilities and to ensure that financial
4

commitments and responsibilities are met.
Lakewood Plan
Lakewood, California was one of the first examples of a municipality
that contracted all of its municipal services with another government. In
1954, Lakewood incorporated to stave off annexation by Long Beach, a
neighboring municipality. Lakewood utilized contractual agreements to
avoid start-up and maintenance costs of standard municipal bureaucracies
(Miller 1981). Lakewood maintained its legislative governing functions,
which included responsibilities such as budgeting, finance, planning, and
policy formation, while contracting municipal services, such as police, fire,
and trash services. This model became known as the “Lakewood Plan.” The
Lakewood Plan provided a road map for municipalities to contract services
production traditionally reserved as a responsibility of the provisioning
municipality (Jamison and Bigger 1957).
The police services provided to Lakewood represent a standardized
service delivery model. Services are standardized because the provider, the
County Sheriff’s Department in this case, maintains a set of uniform
standards that apply to police practices (Mehay 1979, 61). Under the
Lakewood Plan the Sheriff’s Department developed a unitized method
through which police services were offered. An example of a defined unit
was a police-car-on-continuous-patrol with the associated auxiliary services
provided (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 839). The Lakewood Plan also
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provided an example of standardized police services provided to a
municipality by a contracted agency and an example of how to provide police
service with unitized methodology.
The Lakewood Plan is important to any discussion of contractual
agreements for the provision of municipal law enforcement services because
the plan has been successful. Lakewood was the first municipality to contract
police services from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department 2009, 5). Today, the Sheriff’s Department still
provides police services to the City of Lakewood. The Sheriff’s Department
provides police services for forty-two of the eighty-eight municipalities
within Los Angeles County (personal interview, September 11, 2015). One
former ranking member of the St. Louis County Police Department pointed
out that the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department program was an example for
St. Louis County officials on how to effectively implement and manage
municipal police contracts (personal interview, June 9, 2014).
Why Understanding Police Contracting is Important
The state provides police services as a public good for order
maintenance. A pure public good is non-rival and non-excludable. Non-rival
means that the consumption of the good by one consumer does not diminish
the ability of another consumer to utilize the good. Non-exclusion means that
it is impossible to prevent people from using the good, even those who may
not be paying for the good (i.e. free-riders). When a public good is both non-

6

rival and non-exclusionary then it is known as “pure.” However, most public
goods—such as police services—are not pure (Hirsch 1970 and Hardin 1982).
Police services are rivalrous, therefore, they are not pure. Traffic on a
freeway is commonly used as an example to explain rival goods. As traffic
increases, the ability for drivers to fully enjoy the benefits of the freeway is
lessened (e.g., the creation of traffic jams). Similarly, police service is rival
because as calls for service increase, the benefits available to other citizens
decrease. For example, during times of high call volume, pro-active patrols
decrease and response times increase. Therefore, as police utilization
increases, benefits decrease.
Police services may be rival, but they are not exclusionary. Service
exclusion is generally referred to in the context of the “free rider” problem;
that is, can those who do not pay for goods or services be excluded from their
use. Free riders are often a problem when the ability of others seeking to
utilize the good or service is diminished. While some police services may be
excluded (e.g., alarm calls), police services are not excluded from free riders
(e.g., citizens who don’t pay their taxes or those without legal status in the
United States). Understanding the provisioning of police services is
important because these decisions impact the actual day-to-day operations of
police services. For example, a department with more resources may be able
to handle increased demands for service, thus reducing issues of rival
consumption. Utilizing this example, if a small municipal police agency was

7

merged into a larger police agency, the larger police agency may be able to
better meet increased demands for police service.
Police departments and the local governments that support these
departments may also benefit from economies of scale and division of labor.
Economies of scale arise from an increased production of a product (in this
case policing), which leads to a decrease in the cost to produce the product.
Police departments may benefit from economies of scale because one large
department may have increased bargaining power with outside vendors and
contractors (e.g. uniform supply companies). Large departments may also
operate more efficiently because the cost to operate the department is spread
out over a larger group of citizens who pay less for the department. An
increase in revenues dedicated to police services leads to a greater resource
pool than those available to smaller agencies operated by smaller
communities. Division of labor is also important to police services. When
labor is divided, there are certain individuals who work in specialized tasks.
For example, a large police agency may have dedicated units for evidence
collection and processing crime scenes. Small agencies, lacking the size to
divide labor and provide specialization may require an unspecialized patrol
officer to handle crime scene processing. A police official from the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department pointed to economies of scale as a
factor which influenced contracting in Los Angeles County (personal
interview, September 11, 2015).
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Provisioning, Production, and Street Level Bureaucrats
Roger B. Parks and Ronald J. Oakerson studied service production in St.
Louis, MO and Allegheny County, PA. Parks and Oakerson make a
distinction between providers of services and the producers of services. They
define providers as those that “make decisions about whether to make a
service available through public means and, if so, the quality and quantity of
service to make available; how funding will be obtained; and select the
appropriate unit(s) to produce the service” (Parks and Oakerson 1993, 23).
They then define producers as “[those that] transform resource inputs into
service outputs” (Parks and Oakerson 1993, 23). The authors also note that
municipalities may elect production of services be carried out through
contractual arrangements.
Werner Z. Hirsch provided a similar distinction in his work on local
versus area wide government services. Hirsch distinguished between
rendering and financing. Rendering refers to the actual physical production
of the service while financing refers to actually raising funds to meet the
expenditures of physical production (Hirsh 1964, 332).
These authors make a division between providers and producers of
public goods and services. This application could be explained utilizing an
example from a municipality that contracts police service production. The
City of Fenton contracts police service from St. Louis County; Fenton
provisions that police service should be provided, allocates funds for police
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services and then decides how police service is going to be provided (contract
with the County). The St. Louis County Police Department carries out the
actual physical production of police services. As one author articulated, the
concept of provisioning and production allowed public choice theory a
distinction between government and governance (Howell-Moroney 2008, 99).
The concepts of production and provision have been defined separately,
but many governments do both. However, in real world situations, the two
intersect with one another in complex ways. In the example of a municipality
contracting with the St. Louis County Police, the police—acting as the
producer—have an impact on decisions of quality and quantity as well as the
appropriate unit(s) of service production. Standardized policies and
procedures outline how police officers function within the St. Louis County
Police Department. If the outlined standardized procedures are not followed,
the County Police investigates those infractions and takes appropriate action.
The contracting municipality has no say in the standards or quality set for
County Police personnel. Additionally, the County Police have control over
policing methods employed in contract municipalities. The St. Louis County
Police can also recommend the quantity of police officers that are necessary to
police a contract municipality. In this case, it is clear that the producers are
impacting the decisions of the providers.
Raymond G. Hunt and John M. Magenau discuss the role of the police
chief in their book, Power and the Police Chief. They distinguish two types of
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police chiefs, the local versus the cosmopolitan police chief. This distinction
is important because when a municipality contracts with a larger agency,
such as the County Police, the municipality trades a local police chief for a
more cosmopolitan police chief. The authors define a local chief’s viewpoint,
“The chief’s function…was, in short, to preserve and advance customary
concepts and instruments of the police role in society” (Hunt and Magenau
1993, 48). The authors then define the modern chief:
The modern police chief…is now at least widely
conceived on an external or cosmopolitan theory,
the model of public administration—that is, as an
instrumentally rational manager responsible for
preserving the public’s strategic interests and for
ensuring the efficient use of public resources to
those ends (Hunt and Magenau 1993, 48).
Hunt and Magenau differentiate between styles of police leadership and
command. When a municipality contracts police services, the leadership of
policing changes. The styles associated with police leadership are important
and do have consequences on the day-to-day operations of the police.
The administrators of police departments, such as St. Louis County are
not the only police representatives influencing policy decisions. Michael
Lipsky argues that police officers themselves make policy decisions. Lipsky
defines a police officer as a street-level bureaucrat. He defines street-level
bureaucrats as “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in
the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution
of their work” (Lipsky 1980, 3). Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats
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make policy because they have high degrees of discretion and relative
autonomy from organizational authority. The individual police officer
therefore impacts the quality and quantity of police services he/she provides.
For example, a police officer can determine if enforcement action should or
should not be taken. This discretionary authority removes the ultimate
power of policy makers from those that provision services. The police officer
is a part of the production model, but the lines are blurred and the police
officer makes decisions traditionally reserved for the provider.
The blurred lines between production and provision as well as the role
of street-level bureaucrats impact the decisions that are made with regard to
policing decisions. It stands to reason that if a municipality changes who
handles police services, then there will be broad effects on the community.
Community Impacts
The determination by municipalities on the method by which police
services will be provided has an impact on the affected community. There
can be many impacts, but a few are worth discussing to illustrate the
importance of these decisions on communities. Impacts can include social
class and racial segregation, victim reporting, community knowledge of
police officers, irregular service provision, and control and usage of assets.
The theory of social stratification-government inequality thesis explains
that fragmentation within local governments leads to social class and racial
segregation. Richard Hill found that this segregation frequently left
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individuals with the most needs within the population in areas with meager
fiscal resources (1974, 1567). This means that areas that may need greater
police services may not have the fiscal resources to provide them, or the
police services provided may be inadequate or ill-equipped to handle the
problems of the community. On the other hand, it has been argued that these
communities could have the opportunity to fashion service providers in a
manner that better represents the needs and desires of the community
(Jimenez and Hendrick 2010, 262). The decisions that community leaders
make when it comes to police service providers may reflect the choices of the
local community, the inability for the community to provide adequate police
services due to insufficient funding sources, or a desire to bring in an outside
agency to leverage economies of scale.
Victimization and knowledge of policeman have been associated with
police agency size. One analysis has suggested that citizens in smaller
independent communities expect greater police follow-up and investigation
after reporting a crime (Ostrom and Whitaker 1973, 64). Citizens in
communities with local police control may expect greater police follow-up
due to a higher likelihood of knowing locally controlled and provided police
officers (Ostrom and Whitaker 1973, 66).
When police services are provided by independent smaller communities
there is an increase in irregular police services. Regular service providers are
those that provide services frequently while irregular service providers
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provide services infrequently and only as needed (Ostrom, Parks, and
Whitaker 1974, 91). In St. Louis County, a municipality may provide police
services, but rely on St. Louis County for processing major crime scenes. In
this example, the municipality would be the regular service provider while
the County would be an irregular service provider. When a municipality
contracts police service from the County, the County becomes the regular
service provider, thus reducing the need for irregular service providers
because the County police will provide the services they once provided
irregularly as a part of the regularly provided services.
The last example of a community impact based on contracting decisions
concerns asset specificity. When a municipality contracts police services they
lose the in-house capability of providing that service. Once in-house
capability is lost, start-up costs can become a barrier preventing
recommencement of in-house services. The establishment of a barrier may
put the contractor in a position to take advantage of the contracting entity if
sufficient competition and compensation is not agreed upon (Kavanagh and
Parker 1999, 3).
The St. Louis Example
Understanding police contracting decisions is particularly important in
St. Louis County, which consists of a myriad of municipalities. Police service
provision and production has not only been the topic of many news articles,
but a topic of discussion within the community for some time. For example,
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the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published a series of articles in late 2003 discussing
problems surrounding small police agencies within St. Louis County
(Ratcliffe and Howard 2003). In late 2011, the same paper, published an oped piece wherein the editors encouraged small police departments in the
County to contract with the County Police (St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial
Board 2011). After the disappearance of a Breckenridge Hills resident in 2013,
another editorial was published condemning the effectiveness of small police
departments in St. Louis County (St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial Board
2013). Questions of police provisioning and contracting have always been on
the radar in St. Louis County, but a recent event in Ferguson brought policing
matters to the forefront of the public conscience.
On August 9, 2014, the attention of the St. Louis community was jolted
to matters of policing, municipal governance, as well as the impact of history
and shifting demographics on municipalities within St. Louis County. A
police shooting on that date and the ensuing response from government
leaders and citizens served as a focusing event that put the issue of police
reform and police contracting squarely in the public agenda.
The incident occurred in Ferguson when a municipal police officer on
patrol encountered two young males walking down the street. The officer,
investigating a robbery, stopped to speak with the two. An altercation took
place between one of the males and the police officer leading to the officers
use of deadly force against one of the males, who was unarmed. Following
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the shooting, rioting broke out in Ferguson and nearby communities, which
was met with a heavy police response. The grand jury investigating the facts
of the incident, as well as a separate probe by agencies within the Department
of Justice, found there was not enough probable cause for an indictment of
the officer. The release of the grand jury decision was met with a new round
of demonstrations.
The incident in Ferguson acted as a catalyst that thrust policing onto the
public agenda. Media outlets, government and civic leaders, and everyday
citizens began discussing how municipalities police themselves. Questions
concerned everything from police officers wearing body cameras to concerns
that police department demographics should reflect community
demographics. These concerns were not only raised in St. Louis, but
nationally.
Ferguson raised concerns about the interaction of place, race, and
socio-economic factors on policing and the criminal justice system. Place has
always mattered, some municipalities in St. Louis County incorporated in
efforts to maintain demographic homogeneity. Andrea S. Boyles recently
published a study focused on the experiences of African Americans with the
police in the Meacham Park area of Kirkwood. Boyles’ work emphasized the
role place and race has on interactions with. She concludes that place does
matter and, in the Kirkwood case, there is a disparity between policing tactics
used with poor minorities and those of white residents (Boyles 2015, 189).
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While Boyles’ work focused on Kirkwood, the same themes of place, race,
and policing were raised after Ferguson.
Ferguson also raised concerns that small municipal police departments
provided inadequate police services that lacked professionalism and
community relations. Concerns of the misuse of the municipal court system
as a revenue generator for municipalities was also raised and will be
discussed more in the next chapter. The discussion following the events in
Ferguson made policing topics, to include questions of contracting decisions,
even more important to the St. Louis region. Police contracting can and does
change on the ground policies that impact police-citizen interactions.
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Chapter 2
Policing St. Louis County
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine police contracting
decisions. However, it is imperative to understand the landscape within
which these contracting decisions are made and the landscape of policing in
St. Louis County. St. Louis County is located in the eastern part of Missouri.
The County had a population of 998,954 in 2010. The County is 70.3 percent
white, 23.7 percent black or African American, and 6 percent of the
population is from other ethnic groups. The County is made up of a little less
than 508 square miles of land. The median household income is $58,485 and
it is estimated that 10.5 percent of the residents are below the poverty level
(US Census Bureau, 2014). In recent years, the County has seen a decrease in
the total number of Type I crimes, as defined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) (Chart 2.1).
As of December 2015, the County had one County-wide law
enforcement agency (i.e., St. Louis County Police), fifty-six municipal police
agencies, and thirty-four municipalities that contract police services with
another police agency (Table 2.1 and 2.2). St. Louis County is also host to
several specialized police agencies.
St. Louis County Police Department
Prior to the formation of the current County Police Department, St.
Louis County relied on an elected sheriff’s department and constabulary to
provide law enforcement services to the County. A series of scandals rocked
18

the Sheriff’s Department in the early 1950’s. In July of 1953 a citizens’
committee began to study the issue of law enforcement in the County. In
1954, the commission recommended the County should establish a
professional police agency, which would assume all law enforcement powers
and duties of the Sheriff’s Department and the constabulary. County citizens
soon voted to enact the committee’s recommendation and the Department
was established on July 1, 1955. The charter enacting the new Department
also allowed for police contracting services. In the years since the
Department’s inception, it has grown and changed into a professional
modern agency. The allowance within the charter for police contracting
services foreshadowed an agency that would provide a number of
municipalities with police services by way of contracts.
The County Police Department has undergone significant changes
since its inception in 1954. In recent years, the County Police Department has
published annual reports that provide valuable insights into the workings of
the Department and descriptive statistics to understand how the Department
has changed in recent years. From 2005 to 2014, County Police expenditures
increased by 50 percent, increasing yearly. Over the same period of time, the
authorized strength of the Department increased as well, showing a 13
percent increase on balance. In 2014, the County Police had a total force
strength authorization of 855. Recent trends indicate the Department’s
budget and manpower strength will continue to increase.
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Since its establishment, the St. Louis County Police Department has
grown into a professional organization. It was accredited by The
Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA)
on November 21, 1998 and was reaccredited on November 21, 2013 (CALEA,
2014).
Municipal Police Agencies
The majority of municipalities in St. Louis County are served by
municipal police services provided directly by the municipality. These
agencies serve small municipalities and large municipalities. The smallest
municipality with its own police agency is Kinloch, 2010 population of 298,
while Florissant, 2010 population of 52,158, represents the largest
municipality served by its own police agency. From 2003 to 2010, the County
Police conducted an annual survey of municipal departments; however,
participation in the survey was at the discretion of each individual
municipality. In 2015, following the events of Ferguson, Better Together,
initiated an effort to collect data on police agencies in St. Louis County. The
data was published in an April 2015 report titled, Police Report #1: Regional
Overview. The data collected from these surveys represent the best data sets
available regarding municipal police agencies within St. Louis County.
In 2015, the respondent municipalities had an average of twenty-nine
full-time officers. The average annual pay for a municipal police officer in the
County was $48,773, while the average annual pay for a County police officer
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was $48,248. Of the respondents, the municipality with the lowest average
police officer salary was Velda City, which reported an average annual salary
of $26,808; the highest average police officer salary was reported by
Brentwood, at $70,341 annually (Better Together 2015). In the last annual
survey conducted by the County Police, Kinloch reported the lowest average
salary while Brentwood reported the highest average salary (St. Louis County
2010). The difference in police officer salaries provides an illustration of the
differences in the resources municipalities have to fund police services.
Municipal resources are also reflected in reported police budgets
(Chart 2.2). Of the 2015 respondents, the lowest police budget per capita was
Glendale, which reported a per capita police budget of $184.06; while the
highest was Edmundson, which reported a per capita police budget of $1,138.
Budget figures provide another illustration of the differences in municipal
resources for police services.
Contracted Municipal Police Services
Approximately 100,000 citizens are served by an outside police agency
contracted by their municipality for police services. Of those citizens, the
majority are served by County Police. Later in this study, three will be
examined in depth. In this section, other municipalities will be examined to
provide the reader with an understanding of municipal police contracting in
St. Louis County.
In St. Louis County, municipalities with the smallest populations
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contract more than municipalities with the largest populations (Table 2.3).
Twenty-two of the thirty smallest municipalities in the County contract police
services. Of the thirty largest municipalities in the County, only two contract
police services.
The majority of municipalities in St. Louis County do not employee a
professional city manager or administrator. Municipalities that do not
employee a city manager or administrator have a higher rate of contracting
than do municipalities with a professional manager (Table 2.4). Twenty-eight
of the fifty-five municipalities without professional management contract
police services, while six of the thirty-five municipalities with a professional
manager contract police services.
Municipalities in St. Louis County differ in their racial make-up, some
are predominantly minority while others are almost exclusively white.
Predominantly minority municipalities, those with a white population of less
than fifteen percent, contract at about the same rate as do municipalities that
are majority white (those with a white population greater than eighty-five
percent) (Table 2.5).
In the 2010 census, Kinloch was listed as having the lowest median
household income at $19,231, while Country Life Acres had the highest
median household income at $212,500. If the municipalities of St. Louis
County were divided equally into thirds, the municipalities with the lowest
median household income contract police services less than those
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municipalities in the middle range and those with the highest median
household income (Table 2.6).
Municipalities in St. Louis County receive a large share of revenue
from a countywide one-cent sales tax. Cities may be divided into three types
of cities: point-of-sale cities, pool cities, and a hybrid of the two. Point-of-sale
cities retain all of the sales tax generated in their communities. Pool cities,
share sales tax revenues on a per capita basis. Hybrid cities are mostly pointof-sale cities, but the cities have annexed land after 1984, the annexed land
area remains in the sales tax pool. Pool cities have a higher rate of contracting
than do point-of-sale and hybrid cities. Fifty-four percent of pool cities
contract police services, compared with ten percent and nineteen percent of
point-of-sale respectively (Table 2.7).
The descriptive statistics presented above represent characteristics of
municipalities that have chosen to contract police services versus those that
have an in-house police department. The section below, will examine the
agencies that provide police services via contract.
Municipal Police Providers
In north St. Louis County, the municipalities of Maryland Heights,
Normandy, and Vinita Park provide police services to neighboring
municipalities. Maryland Heights provides police services to Champ. At
present, Normandy is the largest municipal police contractor. Normandy
provides police services to Bellerive, Cool Valley, Glen Echo Park, Greendale,
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and Pasadena Park. Champ began contracting police services in 2005 and
initially paid Maryland Heights $15,000 a year to police the village of sixteen
people (“Trustees Want More Time to Put Together New Budget” 1996).
Cool Valley dissolved its police department in 2013 in an effort to save
money. Cool Valley reached an agreement with Normandy in which the
patrol cars used to patrol Cool Valley would bear the logo of Cool Valley
(Hampel 2013). In June of 2015, Vinita Park founded the North County Police
Cooperative and began providing police services to Wellston. In October of
2015 the North County Police Cooperative began policing Charlack.
Beverly Hills currently provides police services to Velda Village Hills,
a municipality of approximately 1,055 citizens. Velda Village Hills had a
contract with the County Police at one time, but in 1998, the village decided to
sign a contract with Beverly Hills for police protection. The village was
concerned about teens loitering, speeding, and derelict properties (Moore
1998). In 2001, residents grew frustrated with Beverly Hills and began
shopping for police services (Posorske 2001). In 2004, the trustees of the
Village decided to switch the policing contract to Northwoods (Levy 2004).
Since then, trustees have again contracted police services from Beverly Hills.
In mid County Kirkwood and St. John provide contract police services.
Kirkwood has had a long standing contractual partnership with Oakland for
police services. A little over 600 Sycamore Hills residents receive police
services from St. John.
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In west County, the municipalities of Crystal Lake Park, Huntleigh,
and Westwood contract police services from Frontenac. Combined, these
three contract municipalities have just over one thousand residents. Town
and Country provides police services for Country Life Acres, which boasts a
population of seventy-four residents.
In south County, Shrewsbury has provided police services for
Mackenzie since 1976.
County as Police Provider
Black Jack, located in north County, was the first municipality to
contract with the County Police in 1970. Other north County municipalities
that receive police services from the County are Dellwood, Flordell Hills, and
Jennings.
In mid County, the municipalities of Hanley Hills, Norwood Court,
Pasadena Hills, and Uplands Park receive police services from the County
Police. Hanley Hills switched to County provided police services at the
beginning of 1992. Hanley Hills represented the first time the County Police
took over policing from a municipality that previously provided its own fulltime police force.
Before switching to the County Police in 1996, Pasadena Hills
contracted police services from Northwoods. Residents and leaders of
Pasadena Hills grew unhappy with the services they were receiving from
Northwoods after Northwoods elected a new mayor, which was followed by
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a change in police leadership (Cox 1996).
In south County, the County Police provide police services for
Grantwood, Green Park, Marlborough, and Wilbur Park. Grantwood
switched to a County contract in 1994 after the death of a their then full-time
city marshal (“Grantwood Village Will Keep Contract With County Police”
1999). Green Park was incorporated in June of 1995 and officials there
decided upon incorporation to contract police services from the County.
Marlborough dissolved its police department in 1997 in favor of a County
contract. The reason for the change was cited as financial as well as a desire
to change the municipality’s image, particularly, a desire to shed the image of
a speed trap (Birmingham 1997).
In west County, Clarkson Valley, Twin Oaks, Valley Park, Wildwood,
and Winchester contract with the County for police services. Clarkson Valley
contracted police services from Ballwin in the 1980’s, but in 2007, the
municipality agreed to a five-year contract with the County Police (Metro
Digest 2007). Winchester also had a contract with Ballwin, but switched to
the County Police in 2000 (“West Post Briefs” 2000). Similar to Clarkson
Valley and Winchester, Country Life Acres had a contract with a neighboring
municipality, Town and Country, for police services. However, in 1997, the
Board of Trustees in Country Life Acres decided to contract with the County
because they felt they would obtain greater services at less cost (Billingsly
1997).
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In 1998, Valley Park decided on a County police contract. The change
was motivated by financial issues and problems within the police
department. At the time of the turnover, then Mayor Daniel Adams believed
the switch would save $1.2 million over five years (Little 1998). Prior to the
change, the in-house police department had been the subject of a number of
complaints. Unlike Valley Park, Wildwood did not have its own police
department; rather, when Wildwood was incorporated in 1995 the County
Police were contracted to provide police services.
Specialized Police Agencies and Services
St. Louis County has a myriad of specialized police departments.
Several institutions of higher education have their own police departments.
For example, the University of Missouri - St. Louis and Washington
University have police departments with staffing levels that rival many small
municipalities.
Lambert Airport, which is located in St. Louis County, but an entity of
the City of St. Louis, has its own police force, that was recently merged into
the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD). The County Police
and SLMPD have an agreement with Metrolink, which is the regional lightrail and bus authority, to provide police protection to the public transit
agency. Major railroads running through the County have their own police
agencies, whose officers are given State police powers on railroad property.
The Missouri State Highway Patrol, Troop C, also provides a law
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enforcement presence in the County. At one time, Troop C was
headquartered in Kirkwood before moving to Town and Country. Most
recently, Troop C’s headquarters was moved to Weldon Springs located in St.
Charles County. The Patrol is primarily responsible for traffic enforcement
and accident investigations on State roadways within the County, but the
Patrol acts as an additional law enforcement source for police services as
needed.
Collaborative Policing Initiatives
Despite the number of police agencies in the County, there are
collaborative initiatives to handle some policing matters. Those efforts
include 911 call centers, police training academies, law enforcement computer
systems and information sharing networks, as well as specialized police units.
Many communities within the County utilize regional 911
communication centers or contract this service from the County Police. For
example, the Central County Emergency 911 Center receives 911 calls and
dispatches fire and emergency medical services (EMS) units in western St.
Louis County and parts of Franklin County. Several municipalities have
come together to form consolidated regional 911 call centers and dispatching
services, such as the East Central Dispatch Center West Central Dispatch
Center, which is also the latest example of a regional collaboration for
dispatching within St. Louis County.
The St. Louis County Municipal Police and Fire Training Center
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provides instructions to recruit police officers who will serve throughout the
region. Recently, it was announced that, in an effort to cut costs, SLMPD
would close their own police academy and collaborate with the St. Louis
County Police Academy. These training centers also provide in-service
continuing education training for public safety personnel within the region.
The Regional Justice Information Services (REJIS) network in St. Louis
allows police agencies within the St. Louis region to have a computerized
network that is customizable to fit the needs of the metropolitan region.
Another added benefit to this service is that the computer system contains
information specific to the region, such as municipal warrants with a small
extradition range (i.e. if a municipality issues a warrant for failure to appear,
the police agency may only pick-up the offender within the metropolitan
area). The County Police utilize a reporting system known as the ComputerAssisted Report Entry System (CARE), which allows multiple agencies a
single repository for police reports, thus reducing the burden of maintaining
individual networks for reports.
In Saint Louis County numerous municipal police agencies participate
in a mobile reserve SWAT team and it was recently announced that SLMPD’s
SWAT team would join their resources with the County Police. St. Louis has
had a long tradition of sharing air assets, such as police helicopters, through
the Metro Air Support Unit.
These collaborative efforts provide examples of resource sharing and

29

collaboration within policing in the County.
Municipal Courts, Policing, and Revenue
Municipal courts and the revenue generated through court
proceedings are not the focus of this paper. However, these topics are worth
mentioning because they play an important role in the criminal justice
system. While policing impacts the daily life of the community and the
citizenry, the actions taken by police officers are enforced by the court system.
The courts have the ability to levy fines and fees and issue arrest warrants.
The ability of the courts to act as municipal revenue generators in the St.
Louis region has been a topic of conversation recently. In some cases, the
accusation is made that the police act in concert with municipal courts to
ensure an adequate revenue stream for municipal functions.
One former police bureaucrat summarized the importance of the
courts by pointing out that policing could be contracted, or changed, but the
municipal courts would still act independently. As an independent body, the
courts could continue to issue large fines, bench warrants for offenders who
fail to appear, and reduction or dismissal of charges for municipal residents
or those with the ability to pay. In theory, a municipality could contract
police services, which may reduce enforcement of certain laws (e.g. minor
traffic offenses), resulting in a reduction of a valuable revenue stream.
However, the courts could increase fees and fines to a point that would fill
the gap left by reduced enforcement efforts (personal interview, January 10,

30

2015).
A report by the Department of Justice concerning the Ferguson Police
Department found troubling evidence that members of the City’s
administration, police, and court divisions acted in concert to increase
municipal revenue through law enforcement practices. The report stated,
“[Ferguson] budgets for sizeable increases in municipal fines and fees each
year, exhorts police and court staff to deliver those revenue increases, and
closely monitors whether those increases are achieved” (United States
Department of Justice (hereafter USDOJ) 2015, 2). The Department of Justice
also uncovered troubling documents from the City's Finance Director. The
report states:
In March 2010, for instance, the City Finance
Director wrote to Chief Jackson [the City's Police
Chief] that "unless ticket writing ramps up
significantly before the end of the year, it will be
hard to significantly raise collections next
year….Given that we are looking at a substantial
sales tax shortfall, it's not an insignificant issue"
(2).
Similarly, in March 2013, the Finance Director wrote to the City Manager:
"Court fees are anticipated to rise about 7.5%. I did ask the Chief if he
thought the PD could deliver a 10% increase. He indicated they would try
(2)." The Justice Department's investigation also discovered that police
officers within the City knew that revenue generation was stressed. This
report lays bare the prevalence of utilizing municipal police agencies as
revenue generators.
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A group of attorneys who perform pro-bono defense services, known
as the ArchCity Defenders, published a white paper examining the problems
with municipal court systems. The group focused on three municipalities,
Bel-Ridge, Florissant, and Ferguson. They argue that police and court
systems in these municipalities target minorities and the poor, who do not
have the means to pay fines or consult attorneys. Further, these policies
contribute to a cycle of poverty impacting the most vulnerable and those on
the fringes of society. They conclude that municipalities utilize their law
enforcement powers as a way to generate revenue, which results in an
antagonistic relationship between residents and the municipality (Harvey, et
al., 2014).
The outcry from groups such as the ArchCity Defenders and the
scathing findings of the Justice Department contributed to new legislation
related to municipalities, fines and fees, as well as municipal courts. This
legislation, Senate Bill 5, created minimum standards for municipal
governance and created process citizens could follow if those minimum
standards are not being met. Within St. Louis County general operating
revenue derived from traffic fines was capped at 12.5%of the annual
operating revenue. Municipalities were also required to submit an annual
report to the Missouri State Auditor detailing revenues from law enforcement
actions (e.g. bonds, fines, court costs, etc.). The legislation also capped fines
for minor traffic violations at $300, limited the conditions in which jail
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sentences could be given, and provided additional guidelines related to court
costs (Missouri Senate, 2015).
Following the events in Ferguson, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon issued
an Executive Order establishing the Ferguson Commission, which examined
data and information concerning the St. Louis region. The Commission’s
published report had several calls to action concerning municipal courts and
the municipal criminal justice system. Recommendations included:
eliminating incarceration for minor offenses; treating nonviolent offenses as
civil violations rather than criminal cases; cancel “failure to appeal warrants;”
institute a process to review warrants; and determine a way to assess an
individual’s ability to pay fines and/or fees and allow installment payment
plans (Ferguson Commission 2015, 94).
While municipal courts are not the focus of this paper, the information
presented above makes it clear that municipal courts play an important role
in the local criminal justice system. The method and manner by which
policing takes place in a municipality impacts the courts. Additionally,
municipalities in St. Louis have utilized the police and the court systems as a
source of revenue generation. It stands to reason that if the provider of police
services were to change then the outcomes in revenue generation may also
change. One former high ranking police official interviewed for this work
recalled a municipality being serviced by a police contract requesting
additional traffic enforcement for the purposes of increasing revenue. The
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servicing police department refused to enforce traffic enforcement for the
purposes of increasing revenue, but did offer to increase traffic enforcement
based upon data indicating certain areas needed focused attention (e.g. school
zones) (personal interview, January 10, 2015).
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
Political scientists have not been blind to topics concerning interjurisdictional agreements, collective action, and public choice. Writers have
spent considerable time exploring these issues and their work provides a
solid foundation on the topic. However, this body of literature fails to
adequately explain the process of municipal police contracting decisions.
This chapter will explore literature relative to this topic and discuss gaps in
the current knowledge as it relates to the topic at hand.
Simon A. Andrew presents an overview of work on interjurisdictional
agreements in his 2009 article, “Recent Developments in the Study of
Interjurisdictional Agreements: An Overview and Assessment.” Andrew
examines pertinent literature, datasets, and research currently being
conducted on interjurisdictional agreements.
A comprehensive national dataset that examines the prevalence of
interjurisdictional agreements does not exist. Andrew points out, “The last
survey of the use of IJAs [interjurisdictional agreements] was conducted more
than two decades ago by the US Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations” (Andrew 2009, 135). While a comprehensive national study
regarding the use of interjurisdictional agreements does not exist, several
local studies have been conducted relative to this topic. The Citizens
Research Council of Michigan conducted a study in 2005 that provides
information on service production agreements for 116 functions in 26 service
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areas in 464 municipal governments in Michigan (Andrew 2006 and The
Citizens Research Council of Michigan 2005). The Michigan study found that
larger cities provide police services with greater frequency than do villages or
townships (The Citizens Council of Michigan 2005, 2).
The State of Iowa maintains information on formal interjurisdictional
agreements created by city and county governments within the State. The
State of Florida also constructed a dataset concerning interjurisdictional
agreements. Andrew explains the Florida dataset, “In 2002, Florida required
its county governments with populations exceeding 100,000 people to
compile information on the IJAs [interjurisdictional agreements] created by
themselves and the local governments within their borders” (Andrew 2009,
136). Although Florida required reporting of significant data, the reporting
requirement was restricted to eight general service areas (education, sanitary
sewer, public safety, solid waste, drainage, potable water, parks and
recreation, and transportation facilities). Andrew holds that in the absence of
a Federal dataset the datasets from Michigan, Iowa, and Florida represent the
best information for understanding the prevalence of interjurisdictional
agreements.
Andrew lists three ways in which scholars have studied the adaptation
of interjurisdictional agreements. The first approach, he states, “frames the
issue as a choice among several different production options” (Andrew 2009,
136). The second approach examines local policy networks and how those
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policy networks influence interjurisdictional agreements. The third approach
utilizes case studies and interviews to explore the motivations for adoption of
these agreements. Many of these case studies have focused on the roles of
elected officials. While this study will make use of case studies, each
approach lacks a perspective that takes into account policy process theories.
The policy process perspective could supplement the existing literature with
a broader theoretical framework to examine the process and factors
influencing policy actors with regard to interjurisdictional agreements.
The rational choice perspective is very prevalent in examining the
adoption of interjurisdictional agreements. One of the primary researchers
using the rational choice perspective has been Richard C. Feiock. Feiock
frames his rational choice argument through a theory known as institutional
collective action.
Literature suggests that municipalities make contracting decisions
from a rational choice perspective that is also rooted in arguments of
institutional collective action (Feiock, Tao, and Johnson, 2004, Feiock 2007,
and Feiock 2009). While the rational choice perspective is prevalent, the
rational choice approach cannot adequately describe the policy process
through which municipal actors determine if their municipality will engage
in police contracting. There are two conflicts within the rational choice
approach. First, from the rational choice perspective, a municipality should
contract police services if the municipality has the potential to save on costs
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associated with providing police services. Second, the rational choice
perspective and the institutional collective action approach hinge on an
assumption that the participating institutions are unitary rational actors that
engage in interjurisdictional cooperative agreements. An examination of the
St. Louis County case demonstrates that some municipalities are not making
decisions based solely on costs. Only a small percentage of municipalities
contract police services despite the availability of viable and cost saving
alternatives. Additionally, the rational choice and institutional collective
action approaches fail to account for the myriad of actors inside the
institution who are behind the scenes working their own agendas and policy
levers to influence these decisions.
Institutional Collective Action
Richard C. Feiock, a leading scholar on interjurisdictional agreements,
utilizes rational choice to frame theories on cooperative agreements and
regional partnerships. Feiock discusses his theories succinctly in two papers,
“Rational Choice and Regional Governance” and “Metropolitan Governance
and Institutional Collective Action.” His theory of institutional collective
action can be useful in understanding some contracting decisions. However,
some of Feiock’s propositions can be challenged when examining the police
contracting decisions within St. Louis County.
Elinor Ostrom distinguished two types of rational choice models in her
2005 book, Understanding Institutional Diversity. The first generation of the
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rational choice models held that actors have complete information and seek to
maximize their benefits. The second generation of rational choice models
accounted for the contextual situations with which decisions are made and
allows for asymmetrical information between actors. It is from this second
generation model that Feiock developed his theory. Feiock defines
institutional collective action this way:
Bilateral contracting and multilateral collective
action are mechanisms by which two or more
governments act collectively to capture the gains
from providing or producing services across a
larger area. Taken together these mechanisms can
be referred to as institutional collective action
(ICA) (Feiock 2007, 48).
In this model, it is assumed that government officials are engaged in a
lengthy cost and benefit analysis of cooperative agreements between
governments in order to capture as many gains as possible. If officials
determine that benefits outweigh costs, then the officials decide to cooperate
on service provision.
Feiock also utilizes the Tiebout tradition to further his argument that
governments will seek to increase collective benefits through collaboration.
The Tiebout tradition holds that individual households make residential
decisions based upon the mix of goods and services offered by individual
municipalities (Tiebout 1956). Reducing externalities and spillover effects
produces significant benefits for citizens. Utilizing the Tiebout model, these
additional benefits may increase the likelihood that citizens will wish to
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reside within these municipalities. Feiock summarizes the work of Brierly,
“Consolidation…solves scale and externality problems, yet their larger scale
reduces local control, inefficiencies, and increases coordination costs” (Feiock
2007, 50 and Brierly 2004). In this summary, Feiock introduces the possibility
that reduction of local government control of a service is a cost when
collaborating for service provision. A reduction in control over police
services may become a stumbling block for policy decisions that favor police
service contracts. Some communities are reluctant to engage in police service
contracts out of fear that the community will lose control over the police.
In Feiock’s model, costs are not the only factors on which decisions
concerning interjurisdictional agreements rest; rather, the contextual nature of
the services that are being considered for cooperation are also factors.
Context may include characteristics of the good or service, configurations of
political institutions, and the networks that exist among local government
officials (Feiock 2007, 48). It is necessary for Feiock to add context to his
theory to avoid a failure of the theory when—from a purely monetary
perspective—it makes sense to contract and collaborate on service
production. Adding context to the equation introduces limitations to
contracting and collaboration and shapes the decision making process that
surrounds collaborative decisions.
Feiock subdivides contextual roles into four groups: the transaction
characteristics of goods, community characteristics, political institutions, and
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the structure of policy networks. Each of these contextual lenses are broken
into smaller pieces that are then presented as propositions.
The transaction characteristics of goods are broken into two
propositions. The first asserts that services with greater asset specificity are
least likely to experience collaborative efforts. Feiock defines asset specificity
as “durable investments that cannot easily be redeployed to other users”
(Feiock 2007, 53). Utilizing Feiock’s definition, an argument could be made
that policing is asset specific. The successful beat officer or detective must
have an understanding of the community in which he serves to be effective.
The notion of community oriented policing is built upon establishing
partnerships built on trust with the community and the police. The
information a police officer learns about one community is not easily
transferable to another community. For example, a police officer from Ladue
could not take the information he knows about that community and apply it
to Wellston. A police officer’s understanding of a local community is asset
specific.
Feiock’s second proposition for the context of the transaction
characteristics of goods is that as the difficulty in measuring and monitoring
service outcomes increases the likelihood of collaborative agreements
decreases. Determining how to measure and monitor service outcomes for
police services is often difficult. Traditional measures have looked at the
number of arrests and clearance rates as well as crime statistics and response
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times (Moore and Braga 2003). James Q. Wilson has argued that these
traditional measures for police performance and the frequent search for better
measures of performance are doomed to fail. Rather, he argues, police should
design methods of neighborhood assessment before and after police
intervention to determine the success or failure of police methods (Wilson
1993, 159). It has also been argued that contracts for police services may
stipulate certain performance measures whereby the contracting municipality
can measure and monitor police performance on pre-determined metrics
(Moe 1984, 760). Despite the difficulties in measuring and monitoring police
performance and service outcomes, a number of municipalities do decide to
contract police services.
Feiock proposes that the characteristics of a community impact
collaboration efforts; he has three propositions related to this theory. The first
and second are that as the level of demographic heterogeneity both among
and within local governments increases cooperative agreements decrease.
The utilization of basic racial demographics reveals that St. Louis County is at
least seventy percent white. The racial breakdown of municipalities that
contract with the County for police services ranges from 99 percent white to
4.1 percent white. Many racially diverse municipalities do contract for police
services and predominantly minority cities contract at a similar ratio than do
predominantly white cities (Table 2.5). Based upon these descriptive
statistics, Feiock’s claim that heterogeneous populations are less likely to
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contract needs more research in regards to the St. Louis County case.
The third proposition concerning community characteristics holds that
agreements tend to form between governments that neighbor one another.
This proposition generally holds true for the St. Louis County case.
Feiock theorizes that the political structure of a community has an
impact on decisions to collaborate, which he explains through five
propositions. Collaboration is expected to increase in states with less
restrictive laws. The more professionally managed a government is, the
greater the likelihood of collaboration. Feiock defines professional
management as a local government with a council-manager form. Yet, in St.
Louis County, only a small number of municipalities that contract for police
services have some type of a professional manager or administrator (Table
2.4). Feiock also argues that the likelihood of collaboration increases when
there are district-based representation systems, elected officials have
durability in their tenure, and when the governments have similar structures
of governance.
Feiock’s last contextual lens revolves around network analysis. He
argues that as local governments become tied to one another they enact
collaborative agreements. Additionally, as local governments become more
tightly clustered and historical relationships exist then collaboration becomes
more likely. Feiock argues that this is the case because close relationships
increase trust and reduce asymmetrical information.
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On balance, Feiock’s institutional collective action framework lacks
explanatory power for the decisions of local municipalities to contract for
police services. Small municipalities that provide their own police services
are too small to achieve economies of scale. From a purely rational choice
perspective, one would theorize that municipalities should contract police
services because the municipality could save money and leverage economies
of scale; however, many small municipalities maintain their own police
agencies. The inability of Feiock’s institutional collective action model to
explain police contracting decisions leaves room to explore these decisions
through other theories. Decisions regarding police contracting are more
complicated than the unitary rational actor perspective posited by Feiock;
these decisions are shaped by political actors and institutions that are
overlooked in the institutional collective action approach.
The rational choice theory draws a line between production and
provision. As discussed in Chapter 1, this line is often blurred. Police
service decisions are not made in an autonomous vacuum motivated by
technical decisions. Rather, contracting decisions have an impact on the dayto-day life of municipal residents. Contracting police services changes the
style and approach of the policing methodology. Rational choice theory
neglects the impact police providers have on the values, interests, and
policing style within communities.
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Police Protection as a Lifestyle Service
Feiock’s institutional collective action theory lacks explanatory power
partly because it fails to take into account the identities of local citizens and
the peculiar networks of police administrators. Kelly LeRoux and Jered Carr
have described police services as a lifestyle service (LeRoux and Carr 2010).
LeRoux and Carr have examined the impact of local officials’ interpersonal
networks on the formation of interjurisdictional agreements.
LeRoux and Carr expound upon Oliver Williams’ 1971 book,
Metropolitan Political Analysis. Williams divides public services into two
generalized groups, system maintenance functions and lifestyle services.
Lifestyle services include public safety services such as police protection as
well as education, parks and recreation, public housing, and economic
development. LeRoux and Carr explain lifestyle services:
These services reflect amenities that vary
dramatically in quality from city to city. Williams
argued that these services distinguish the lifestyles
of wealthier suburban residents and represent the
public amenities over which communities
compete with one another to attract residents and
businesses (2010, 452).
LeRoux and Carr hypothesized and discovered that lifestyle services will
remain decentralized. The reason for this decentralization is that lifestyle
services represent the quality of life within a community. Citizens and
community leaders wish to have lifestyle services that reflect the
characteristics of the municipality. Public safety networks also remain
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decentralized because they display characteristics of low network densities,
which leads to isolation and decreases the likelihood of collaboration.
In St. Louis County many police administrators participate in the same
professional networks, such as the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs Association
(SLAPCA), Missouri Police Chiefs Association (MoPCA), and the
International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP). In the case of police
networks in St. Louis County, an alternative hypothesis could be proposed to
LeRoux and Carr’s hypotheses. The competing proposal would hold that
police chiefs are not isolated and are engaged in public safety networks.
Instead of working to consolidate, these networks help maintain the statusquo fragmentation and entrenchment of local police administrators. Police
administrators are motivated to maintain their jobs and their police
departments. Other police administrators have the same desire and do not
advocate police contracts. Rather, the Chiefs collaborate on smaller
programs, such as Citizens Academies and DARE programs, to save money,
engage their communities, and ultimately save their departments.
Administrators from a large department, such as St. Louis County Police, do
not have to fear losing their jobs or their department; therefore, they are more
willing to advocate police contracts in which the County acts as the provider
of municipal police services.
A distinction also exists between direct services and auxiliary services
provided by police organizations (Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker 1978). Direct
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services are those directed to citizens, such as police patrol, traffic control,
and criminal investigations. Auxiliary services are those services used by the
police, which would include services such as radio communications, entrylevel training, and crime laboratory analysis. This distinction has been
utilized to demonstrate the ability of multiple police agencies to form
cooperative agreements in regards to auxiliary services. At least one study
has shown that the overlap with direct police services is low (Ostrom, Parks,
and Whitaker 1978). Utilizing the alternative hypothesis posited against
LeRoux and Carr, police administrators would advocate collaborative efforts
in the provision of auxiliary services because these services are not directly
provided to citizens.
Correlational Studies
Correlational studies have been used to predict factors that influence
collaborative efforts.
Harry P. Pachon and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., conducted a study
concerning assertions regarding larger police departments through
examining and analyzing citizen satisfaction surveys through quantitative
regression analysis. The authors conducted this study in response to two
competing theories of police services: the reformist perspective that posited
the benefits of larger departments and, conversely, those groups arguing
against consolidation because of the benefits of smaller departments.
Reformists supported large police departments for three reasons: the ability
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to specialize, higher levels of professionalism, and benefits from economies of
scale. On the other hand, those against consolidation argued that
consolidation removed the representativeness that came along with locally
controlled departments and that these concerns outweigh factors of
efficiency, costs, and equity (Pachon and Lovrich 1977, 39).
Pachon and Lovrich examine two assertions. The first concerns costs
and expenditures while the second concerns citizen satisfaction. On the topic
of their first assertion, the authors argue that costs and expenditures of
different police departments differ based upon the demands placed on forces
of varying sizes. As they argue, small suburban police departments do not
handle large amounts of violent crime as do large inner-city departments. On
the second assertion, the authors found that socio-economic characteristics
are the most important variable when examining citizen satisfaction with
police services and not the size of the police agency. They conclude that
larger police agencies would produce more economical and satisfying police
services (Pachon and Lovrich 1977, 45).
James M. Ferris conducted a correlational study to determine the
factors impacting contracting decisions. Ferris sought to examine the actual
decisions of local governments in contracting out municipal services. He
sought to go beyond the traditional examinations of cost savings as the most
important factor in the decision to contract. For his analysis, Ferris utilized
three independent variables: cost savings (supply side forces), fiscal
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pressures, and political forces.
Ferris argued that a municipality must first establish that contracting
will improve cost savings before the municipality will engage in contracting.
Once cost savings are established, then fiscal pressures and political forces
will influence the final decision to contract. The extent to which contracting
efforts can occur is dependent on laws and constituents. Laws limit the fiscal
capacity of a municipality through reducing local control over financial
options. For example, a state may have a law requiring municipalities to run
balanced budgets; while, constituents may demand lower tax rates.
Politicians have a self-serving desire to be reelected and will try to reduce or
maintain tax rates. Politicians do not seek tax increases; therefore, if
contracting will save money and reduce or stabilize tax rates then politicians
will favor service contracts.
Ferris hypothesized that political forces play an important role in
contracting decisions. He states, “even if cost savings are demonstrated and
fiscal prospects are bleak, there is no guarantee that local governments will
opt to contract out” (Ferris 1986, 294). Ferris moves the discussion of
contracting from the purely rational realm and begins to examine the
influence of political actors on contracting decisions. Three potential political
forces that impact contracting decisions: the structure of government (mayorcouncil vs. council-manager), citizens, and public employees. Ferris
summarizes the point at which each of these variables would be the most
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optimal for contracting; he states:
The decision to contract out will be more likely
when (1) the cost savings are greater, (2) the fiscal
limits are more stringent, and (3) the potential
strength of public service constituency groups and
public employees are less powerful (Ferris 1986,
295).
Ferris sought to determine if the proposed optimal level for contracting holds
up to empirical analysis.
Ferris obtained his data from a 1982 study conducted by the
International City Management Association (ICMA), which surveyed local
governments regarding the methods of delivering different service, including
contracting municipal services. Utilizing this data, regression analysis was
conducted for each of the independent variables, which determined that
larger cities are more likely to contract than smaller cities. On the fiscal
variable, it was determined that the higher a city’s tax burden, the greater
likelihood that the city will contract. Ferris also determined that political
variables are highly influential in contracting decisions. Cities with greater
populations of elderly and lower-to lower-middle-income residents are less
likely to contract services. Ferris attributes this finding to the greater reliance
of residents of this demographic on public services, who therefore, desire to
maintain local control of public services. Public employees also play a role
when they make up a large constituency within a city; in these cases, the
likelihood of contracting decreases. Ferris’ findings provide some insight into
contracting decisions.
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David R. Morgan and Michael W. Hirlinger examined factors that
influenced intergovernmental services in their 1991 article. Morgan and
Hirlinger hypothesized that intergovernmental contracting is influenced by
the same factors that influence contracting decisions within the private sector.
They utilized similar factors for their analysis as Ferris. Those factors are cost
considerations, fiscal pressures, and political influences. Morgan and
Hirlinger obtained their data from a 1983 mail survey by the International
City Management Association on the use of intergovernmental service
contracts. The authors then conducted analysis utilizing linear regression to
test the impact of each variable on intergovernmental service contracts.
Morgan and Hirlinger have a number of interesting findings. The first
is rather obvious, but important. Cities outside of metropolitan areas are less
likely to engage in intergovernmental service contracts because of a lack of
suppliers. A second important finding is that municipalities that engage in
contracting have reduced labor costs. Findings also show that both poor and
wealthy communities engage in contracting. The form of government is also
an important factor, cities with a council-manager form of government have a
greater likelihood of engaging in intergovernmental contracting.
Michael A. Nelson examined the probability of not employing an
external service delivery approach in a 1997 article. Nelson borrows from
industrial organization literature on the “make” or “buy” dilemmas private
firms face. Nelson argues that the public sector must also make these
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decisions. Nelson utilized a 1992 International City Management Association
survey from 1,221 municipalities to conduct empirical analysis. This study
found that municipalities do not always elect the mechanism of least-cost to
deliver services. Rather, as preferences for service delivery becomes less
heterogeneous then the likelihood of contracting decreases.
These authors utilize correlational studies to determine the variables
that directly impact contracting decisions. Pachon and Lovrich examine
citizen satisfaction as it relates to jurisdictional size. Ferris as well as Morgan
and Hirlinger exemplify the importance of examining cost considerations,
fiscal pressures, and political influence variables in correlational studies to
examine contracting decisions. Nelson provides information on the
expectation on contracting police services.
Studies Specific to St. Louis
Terrence Jones, in his work on fragmentation within St. Louis County,
found that suburban municipalities within the County were incorporated
because citizens sought homogenous cities and villages (2000, 58). Jones,
building on the work of other scholars (i.e. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren
1961) found that fragmentation created a marketplace. This marketplace was
built upon public choice; namely, the ability of citizens to choose the
municipality that had the right balance of services and goods for the
individual’s taste (Jones 2000, 125). Jones also identifies a consequence of
fragmented policing in which police look the other way on violations
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committed by local residents and outside residents are handled with a
heavier hand (Jones 2000, 132).
Jones articulates that municipal law enforcement services that flow
from the fragmented nature of St. Louis County allows for each municipality
to find a policing style that best fits the municipality the department serves.
In instances where the municipality cannot afford a police department, the
municipality can buy the service from a neighboring municipality or St. Louis
County (Jones 2000, 131).
Jones also discusses ways in which fragmented municipalities can
adapt policies that leverage economies of scale while maintaining local
control. One example of this is the training of police officers through the use
of a police academy that services the County and all municipalities within the
County. Another example of this is found in the Regional Justice Information
System (REJIS), in which police agencies within the metropolitan area can
easily relay criminal justice information. Jones summarizes the state of law
enforcement within St. Louis County, “local control is the default option,
but…cooperation can and does occur when appropriate” (Jones 2000, 134).
Numerous citizen satisfaction surveys, that report positive responses for
locally controlled police agencies, have been utilized to promote and justify
this fragmented system.
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Ronald J. Oakerson and Roger B.
Parks studied a variety of topics, including metropolitan governance,
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organization, and service delivery in St. Louis County (Oakerson and Parks
1993). In one of their works, the two compared service delivery examined St.
Louis County and Allegheny County (Pennsylvania). In this work, the
authors point out that Missouri State statute requires municipalities in St.
Louis with populations over 400 to provide full-time police departments.
They found that smaller municipalities in St. Louis County contracted for
police services while small communities in Allegheny County were less likely
to contract for police services; rather, smaller municipalities in Allegheny
County staffed their police departments with part-time officers (Oakerson
and Parks 1993, 24).
Oakerson and Parks found that the existence of fragmented police
services was supported by integrating structures, that is coordination that
occurs between various service providers to produce indirect services. For
example, various police agencies collaborate on things such as training and a
regional crime-laboratory (Oakerson and Parks 1993, 24). The authors argue
that cooperation through integrating structures supports fragmented
production of direct services.
Oakerson and Parks write about the Tiebout model in conjunction with
citizen voice and the ability of citizens to vote with their feet. Voting with
feet means that citizens have the ability to move from a municipality that
does not provide the mix of services desirable by the citizen. They argue that
voice and exit act as a constraint on the conduct of local officials. The desire
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of citizens to find municipalities that present a basket of services to meet the
needs of the citizens leads to an increase in the number of provisioning units
(i.e. municipalities). However, they point out that in St. Louis County the
number of production units falls below provision units for police services.
They find that provision units can capture individual preferences within St.
Louis County because there are a number of active providers for police
services. Municipalities within St. Louis County can shop for a provider that
fits the preferences of the provisioner (Oakerson and Parks 1988). As
discussed earlier, producers have considerable discretion in the
implementation of contracts with municipalities. In practice, there is a
blurring of the distinction between provision and production.
The proceeding pages have examined literature pertinent to the topic
of interjurisdictional agreements, institutional collective action, police
protection as a lifestyle service, correlational studies germane to the topic at
hand, and literature specific to St. Louis that discusses cooperative
agreements. Each one of these studies provides knowledge and insight;
however, what is missing is a study specific to the political and policy process
that impacts decisions related to interjurisdictional agreements, specifically
police contracting, within St. Louis County.
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Chapter 4
Hypotheses and Methodology
The proceeding chapter discussed literature relevant to police
contracting decisions. The existing literature does not provide a cohesive
understanding of the interplay between theories concerning public choice, the
policy process, and certain aspects of criminal justice theory on contracting
decisions. The proposed hypotheses for this work will be formulated from
agenda setting and policy formulation literature, as well as some policing
literature. This section will examine relevant concepts from these areas and
how they relate to contracting decisions.
Policy Process Issues and Contracting
The first two hypotheses derive from agenda setting and policy
formation literature, specifically focusing events, policy windows, and
punctuated change. The majority of literature germane to agenda setting and
policy formation concerns the Federal government. However, important
concepts from this literature can be applied to contracting decisions at the
municipal level.
John W. Kingdon argued there are three types of processes that impact
agenda formation: problems, policies, and politics (1995, 16). When an issue
becomes a problem, then the probability that the issue will become an agenda
item increases. Policies can become agenda items when policy experts
intervene and consider policy problems and discuss alternatives. Political
forces can also shape the agenda when political mood shifts or elections
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change the make-up of elected officials.
Kingdom proposed that focusing events can force issues onto the
agenda. Issues are not always evident to the general public, but focusing
events can propel an issue onto the agenda. Kingdom presented events such
as a crisis or a disaster (1995, 94) as potential agenda drivers. A police
department embroiled in turmoil and scandal can become a municipal crisis.
When a crisis involving a municipal police department occurs, the
municipality may be forced to examine police services, which may lead to
questions of police control and police production alternatives.
Kingdon theorized that policy changes occur when policy windows
open. A policy window was defined as “an opportunity for advocates of
proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special
problems” (Kingdon 1995, 165). A policy window is an opportunity for
agendas considered separately in the various streams to come together.
When all three streams (problems, policies, and politics) are coupled, the
likelihood for policy change increases.
Policy windows open for a finite period of time, which restricts the
ability for policy changes to occur. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D.
Jones’ punctuated equilibrium theory is a complementary policy process
framework, which can also be applied to police contracting issues.
Punctuated equilibrium theory holds that the policy process is usually quite
stable with only incremental changes but periodically sharp bursts of
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heightened attention to a problem or issue, results in the possibility for policy
change.
During times of policy stability, Baumgartner and Jones argue that
existing political structures and the definition of issues allow for stable
policies. However, destabilization can occur within the policy arena.
Destabilization is defined as a time when issues become redefined.
Destabilization can occur when new participants are added or when there is a
change in institutional rules or jurisdiction. During periods of
destabilization, efforts are made to restore a state of stabilization.
During periods of policy development, which occur during periods of
destabilization, policy image influences policy development as well as public
policy venue. Policy image is defined as the understanding and discussion of
a policy (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 25). Policy images are both empirical
and emotive. Policy images involving the emotive set a tone for how the
policy will be discussed. For example, discussions regarding police
contracting take on very different tones if the initial discussion was motivated
by budget issues versus a discussion that was motivated by police detectives
failing to adequately investigate violent crimes.
Policy venue is defined as the institutional location that has the power
to make authoritative decisions concerning policy issues (Baumgartner and
Jones 2009, 32). Policy venue concerning policing has become important in
the St. Louis County context after the events of Ferguson. At one time, police
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decisions were very localized issues left mostly to municipal institutions.
After Ferguson, the institutional location of policing decisions has expanded
as the Missouri State Legislature, Courts, and the Federal Government are all
engaged in discussions of policy issues concerning municipal policing.
For punctuated change to occur, there must be a change in both image
and venue, which they describe as the image-venue interaction. If a policy
image changes, then the likelihood of policy venue change increases. If venue
changes, then the likelihood of policy image change increases. Image-venue
interactions may be seen in police contracting decisions where publicized
problems with police services lead to image changes. The change in policy
image related to policing may result in discussions of police contracting,
which culminates in the addition of those involved in the policy venue, for
example the addition of the County Police in municipal discussions regarding
police services.
The policy process literature concerning focusing events and
punctuated equilibrium provide the foundation for two of the hypotheses for
contracting decisions.
First, from Kingdon, for police contracting to make it to the agenda and for
it to succeed, there must have been a focusing event or public problem with the inhouse police services. Governments have a long list of problems that they could
attend to, but only some problems actually make it onto the agenda.
Focusing events draw attention to a specific problem and allow policy
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windows to open. Kingdon also theorizes that budgets can act as problems
that focus the agenda on a set of issues (e.g. how is the municipality going to
continue in-house police services). Without some sort of problem or focusing
event, matters concerning police contracting will not make it onto the agenda.
The punctuated equilibrium theory ties in well to focusing events and
provides the second hypothesis of this work. For police contracting decisions to
succeed there must be a change in image and venue. First, the image of police
contracting can change through focusing events. A focusing event, such as
police misconduct, may reshape the image of the police and the policy debate
surrounding how to fix the problems of a local police force. Second, venue
also changes as the image of the policing policy debate shifts. The idea of
venue is best described as the bringing in of outsiders into the local municipal
debate regarding policing. For example, if a scandal rocks a municipal police
department causing a shift in image, which leads to a policy debate, the
County police may enter the debate and offer a solution for the municipality.
Thus, the venue of the debate has expanded. The election of new politicians
or the departure of long-standing bureaucrats can also result in a change of
venue.
The theories of focusing events and punctuated equilibrium, which are
part of the policy process literature, add explanatory powers for police
contracting decisions. First, utilizing Kingdon’s theory of focusing events, for
contracting to make it to onto the agenda and succeed, there must have been
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a public problem or event that has focused attention on matters of policing
that float the issue to the top of the agenda. Kingdom also theorized that
budgets could act as agenda drivers and for the purposes of this study,
budgetary issues will be considered problems that have the ability to focus
the agenda on policing issues.
Second, from punctuated equilibrium theory, for contracting to make it
onto the agenda and succeed there must have been a change in both image
and venue. The image of the existing police agency must have changed for
discussions of police contracting to rise to the top of the agenda. For police
contracting to succeed, there must also be a change in venue. In this context,
a change of venue can take the form of additional actors or the addition of
actors with the subtraction of other actors. For example, municipal leaders
may pursue police contracting after the election of a new mayor. The election
of a new mayor would be an additional actor. Subtracted actors may also be
influenced. For example, a municipality may be reluctant to engage in
contracting discussions when a long term and well liked police chief is in
office. However, if the police chief leaves, municipal leaders may be willing
to engage in contracting discussions. In these instances, the venue landscape
would have changed because of the subtraction of an actor involved in the
municipal policy process.
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Policing Styles and Contracting
The last hypothesis is derived from the work of James Q. Wilson who
was a pioneer in policing studies. Wilson wrote about policing styles in his
book, Varieties of Police Behavior. Wilson described three types of police
behavior: the watchmen style, the legalistic style, and the service style.
Wilson offered the following explanation for examining police styles:
I try to describe the behavior of patrolmen
discharging their routine law-enforcing and ordermaintaining functions, to explain how that
behavior is determined by the organizational and
legal constraints under which patrolman work, to
discover the extent to which it varies among police
departments, and to determine insofar as the
evidence permits what accounts for these
differences and especially how local politics
contributes to them (Wilson 1968, 10).
Wilson’s theories on police behavior are important to conversations regarding
police contracting because organizational context and local politics have an
impact on policing. Wilson argues that politics shape the methods and
operations of police. Wilson is also concerned with street-level bureaucrats,
in Wilson’s case, the police patrolman. The police patrolman makes policy
decisions that are reinforced by police administrators and the local political
culture. Patrolman behavior and methods of duty fulfillment provide
evidence of the type of policing style employed in a subject municipality.
The watchman style is characterized by police behavior that
emphasizes order maintenance within the community. Officers engage in an
analysis of the situations to which they are called, resulting in judgment of
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the seriousness of the infraction. Less serious infractions are not enforced,
rather, officers ensure peacefulness and order is restored. If order is broken
and cannot be easily restored then the officer takes action reminiscent of the
role of a traditional law enforcer (Wilson 1968, 141). Cities that display
watchman tendencies have departments that do not want to upset the status
quo, the department is highly sensitive to complaints and there is no formal
review process. When complaints are received, the police chief handles the
complaints personally to maintain order and police legitimacy (Wilson 1968,
149). Departments with low pay and low education are consistent with the
watchman style. Recruitment is frequently done from within the city. These
departments also tend to have little or no written rules or specializations
within the rank and tend to be highly politicized. Wilson concludes, “An
unspecialized department tends to be a watchman-like department that in
turn tends to resist specialization” (Wilson 1968, 155).
The legalistic style is described as the antithesis of the watchman style.
Legalistic departments place the law enforcement aspect of police work at the
forefront of their police methodology. Problems are handled through formal
police action that results in high rates of traffic tickets and arrests. Instances
of law violations that did not upset public order often end in an arrest.
Wilson describes legalistic police departments, “The police will act…as if
there were a single standard of community conduct” (Wilson 1968, 172).
Administrators demand that officers follow strict adherence to the laws and
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policies thus molding a legalistic department. Wilson hypothesizes that these
departments act this way because police administrators want to reduce the
possibility or suspicion of corruption. Administrators can also ensure that
politicians and members of the public cannot accuse the department of failing
to act. Generally, these departments were once corrupt or favor-doing
departments and a move toward legalistically enforcing the laws was a
conscious decision by administrators or politicians to change the public’s
perception of the department. These departments generally have a reform
police chief, meaning the police chief is a civil servant as opposed to a
mayoral appointee. The chief seeks to remove politics from police work.
Within a reformed department formal hierarchies develop, efficiencies are
promoted, and complaints are handled formally through an internal affairs
process (Wilson 1968, 186). These departments seek to minimize citizen
complaints through recruiting police officers that can be impersonal and
adhere to the law enforcement aspect of police work.
The service style is Wilson’s third and final style of police behavior.
The service style falls somewhere between the watchman style and the
legalistic style. As Wilson describes this style, “The police take seriously all
request for either law enforcement or order maintenance…but are less likely
to respond by making an arrest or otherwise imposing formal sanctions”
(Wilson 1968, 200). Wilson argues that one of the reasons for this type of
policing style is a desire to keep public opinion of the organization favorable.
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The watchman style centers on keeping the department close to the citizens,
which in turn causes the police to focus on some community concerns over
specific law enforcement problems. This focus on community relations is
central to the department’s values, training, and leadership. This community
focus requires the patrol officer to have a deep knowledge base of the
community. Even though some departments are considerably large,
community service occurs at the local precinct level.
As described above, Wilson theorizes there are three types of policing
styles. If aspects of policing were plotted on a bell curve, the service style
aspects would fill the middle of the bell curve, while the negative attributes
associated with the watchman and legalistic styles would be at the margins.
Aspects of policing at the margins represents the characteristics of concern for
police agencies, for example, a police agency focused solely on traffic ticket
revenue at the expense of community policing.
The watchman and legalistic systems each display unprofessional
aspects that increases their vulnerability to contract decisions. For example,
watchman style departments have little to no professional standards, which
increase the possibility of litigation, citizen complaints, and charges of
corruption. Legalistic departments have such emphasis on enforcing the law
community alienation may result. Community members may feel that the
legalistic system preys on the most vulnerable and alienated citizens because
they are most frequently the subject of law enforcement action. It is also
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important to note that if a municipality contracts police services, then the type
of police service displayed by the outgoing department will not translate into
the new police department. Therefore, if a municipality that previously had a
police department that displayed a watchman or legalistic style contracted
police services from the County, the municipality should not expect the same
type of policing style it had before the County.
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling ushered in the era of
community policing in their groundbreaking 1982 article, “The Police and
Neighborhood Safety.” In this article, the authors posited the “broken
windows” theory. The theory holds that if a building has one broken
window then the others will soon be broken out because one broken window
signals that no one cares about the building. The analogy goes further and
holds that if petty crimes and social disorders (e.g., panhandling, abandoned
property, public fighting, liter, etc.) are allowed to exist then citizens will feel
unsafe. Citizens then begin to avoid areas while those with nefarious motives
move in because there is a public perception that no one cares. The article led
to an explosion in community policing. Community policing, at its core, is to
form cooperative, service-style relationships between the police and citizens
to deal with petty crimes and social disorders. Dealing with minor order
maintenance had previously been thought of as an illegitimate use of the
police, but Wilson and Kelling’s article helped legitimize the role of local
police in order maintenance (Kelling and Coles 1996, 19). Building
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community relations and implementing community policing is particularly
important for a police department that exemplifies the service style. In
instances where municipalities move from a watchman or legalistic style of
policing to a contractor providing a service style could result in increased
community policing, which could reduce crime and increase public support
of police. In instances of police contracting that shifts the policing style to a
service style, service from the outside police agency could result in increased
community input.
Municipal departments in St. Louis County display characteristics of
the policing styles outlined above. For example, the St. Louis County Police
Department displays a service orientation. The Department, while large, has
a focus on community relations and is highly professionalized. The
Department operates patrol operations out of local precincts and appears to
have a good balance of the watchman and legalistic aspects of police work.
Wilson’s study focused on eight municipalities within the State of New York,
which were large and had their institutionalized culture and identity. The
resources to conduct a study of municipalities and classify them in Wilson’s
typology was not possible for this work. Additionally, several of the
municipalities studied, were small communities served by very small police
agencies, which limits the institutionalization of culture and identity. For the
purposes of this work, sources were examined to understand the
characteristics of police agencies and then those characteristics were
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examined under the lens of Wilson’s typologies.
Wilson’s police typologies are important, because the assertion of the
third and final hypothesis is that municipalities that contract police services were
more likely to have operated with the legal and watchman styles, in such a way as
may be considered unprofessional. Measuring professionalism in a quantitative
and objective fashion is outside the scope of the dissertation. For the
purposes of this dissertation, professional policing is policing that is based on
specialized training that requires officers to make decisions based on
standardized best practices of police conduct, which are practices based upon
rules and using judgment to achieve optimum outcomes. The opposite of
professional policing, is a policing methodology based upon the personal
interests of the police or the unfair application of rules on classifications such
as race, ethnicity, place of residence, or income. Professional policing
upholds individual civil rights acting within the parameters of due process
and equal protections as guaranteed in the Constitution. These
unprofessional attributes can be seen in the watchman and legalistic styles.
For example, the watchman style resists specialized training and has no
formal review process for disciplinary issues. The legalistic style can alienate
citizens reducing the optimum outcome of policing. Determining a
professional police agency or individual officer is not always easy. However,
utilizing Wilson’s typologies draws a frame in which to examine police
behavior and professionalism.
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Methodology
To study these hypotheses five case studies were completed on St.
Louis County municipalities. Three municipalities have contracted for police
services, Fenton, Jennings, and Dellwood. Two municipalities, Rock Hill and
Hazelwood, discussed police service contracts, but decided against
contracting. The municipalities selected for this study were chosen because
they vary in their mix of population, household income, and length of time
contracting with the County.
The primary sources of information for this work were news articles,
budgets, and personal interviews. Many news articles were pulled from the
archives of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Approximately forty-five individuals
were contacted and requested to participate in a semi-structured interview.
Of those contacted, twenty agreed to participate in an interview. Qualitative
interviews were conducted with questions that focused on the factors that
contributed to the contracting discussion and decision. Most of the
interviewees provided information which could be verified through public
records, such as newspaper articles. A handful of interviewees provided
insights into political decisions and motivations that did not make the public
record. These insights are presented and noted within each case study. In
several instances, the public record provided a well documented narrative of
the changing perceptions of police services throughout the contracting
process.
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Interviewees were promised anonymity prior to each interview.
Interview notes were taken and are maintained by the author. To maintain
anonymity, information received directly from interviewees will be noted
generically as a personal interview, along with the date of the interview.
Historical census data for this paper was obtained from the United
States Census Bureau. Uniform Crime Data was obtained from the Missouri
State Highway Patrol and the St. Louis County Police Department. Census
information and crime data were used to obtain a better understanding of the
case studies.
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Chapter 5
Contract Municipality – Fenton
Of the municipalities studied, Fenton has contracted police services
from St. Louis County for the longest period of time. Fenton was
incorporated in 1837 and is classified as a fourth class city. Fenton began
contracting police services in 1995. The city occupies approximately 6.4
square miles in south St. Louis County and is located next to the Meramec
River. Since 1940, Fenton has grown through annexation and through
suburbanization. In 1940, the City had a population of 171 (United States
Department of Commerce 1943). In 2010, the City had grown to 3,946
residents (Chart 5.1) (United States Department of Commerce 2012). The
City’s demographic make-up is rather homogeneous, with the percent of
white residents consistently above 95% since the 1980’s (Chart 5.2).
As a fourth class city, the City has elected to be governed by a mayor
and a board of aldermen. The mayor and aldermen are elected every two
years. There are eight aldermen elected from the City’s four wards, thus two
aldermen are elected from each ward. State statute allows a fourth class
village to elect a marshal for the purposes of law enforcement.
Like other cities in St. Louis County, Fenton generates the majority of
its annual operating budget from sales tax revenues. Fenton is a point-of-sale
City that also participates in St. Louis County’s sales tax pool in areas
incorporated after 1983. In the past five years, the City has not had a general
fund budget deficit, although budgeted general fund revenue has decreased
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(Chart 5.3).
The Contracting Decision
An obituary appearing in the August 10, 2014, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
declared that Guy L. Youngman had been “called home to Jesus on Friday,
8/8/14” (Obituary of Guy L. Youngman 2014). Youngman served as
Fenton’s town marshal for twenty-eight (28) years. Youngman was first
elected in 1967 and his last term as City Marshal ended in 1993. Although
Youngman served for twenty-eight years, his many terms were not without
problems. In 1984, the Board of Alderman cut his annual salary to $4,200
from $22,500 based upon displeasure with his job performance. In 1989, an
effort by Aldermen to increase Youngman’s salary to $6,000 failed by a 4-3
vote (Gayle 1989), but was subsequently passed. In 1991, an audit was
ordered of the Department and its evidence room following the discovery of
irregularities related to the evidence room. At the same time, police Major Ed
Hanneken was relieved of his duties (Billingsly 1991).
Prior to Youngman’s term, the City was asked to end the practice of
electing a marshal and turn the position into an appointed chief of police.
The ballot measure failed. During Youngman’s term, voters were asked
another five times to do away with an elected marshal and move to an
appointed chief of police. All of the attempts failed. The last ballot measure
during Youngman’s term occurred in 1992. Prior to the 1992 measure,
Youngman supported the measure, but vowed to run if the measure was
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defeated. Youngman was quoted, “If it gets defeated again, I’m going to run
again. People voted it down in previous years knowing I was going to run”
(Fitzmaurice 1992). Youngman also expressed the rationale for his support of
the proposal, “The city is getting larger now, and in an election anyone can
run…. If you get an inexperienced person who would win, it would be bad
for the city” (Fitzmaurice 1992). Youngman expressed concern that an elected
police leader could be unqualified to hold the position, which could lead to
negative consequences for the city. The measures to move the City to an
appointed police chief mirrored other St. Louis County cities in moving away
from elected marshals (Fitzmaurice 1992).
In April of 1993, Al Bryan won the marshal’s position defeating
Youngman and another contender. One former municipal official described
the department, at that time, as having some good police officers with
inconsistent levels of training and professionalism. The former official went
on to say the Department lacked a set of standard operating procedures.
Since the police chief was elected, officers were expected to campaign for the
chief and to promote the chief’s agenda. Officers who campaigned for the
winning chief, knew that the chief would protect them against citizen
complaints and during disciplinary procedures. The lack of procedures and
the spoils of supporting a winning chief, led to a buddy system that created a
pervasive political network within the Department (personal interview, July
2, 2015).
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Another former City official summarized an elected official’s point of
view regarding the Department. The former official made a statement that if
he woke up and a Fenton police officer had been shot, he wouldn’t be sure if
the officer was shot by the suspect they were chasing or another Fenton police
officer (personal interview, July 8, 2015). The implication is that, the
department lacked professionalism. One former County official believed that
the department suffered from poor supervision, despite being paid well
(personal interview, January 10, 2015).
In January of 1995, tension between the elected Marshal and city
leaders was publicized after two police officers, Gary Goede and Billy Ray
Allen, were fired. The officers were fired by the Board of Aldermen under
the mayor’s recommendation. However, Marshal Bryan had recommended
disciplinary action, but not termination. Goede argued that his termination
was caused by a power struggle between the the Board of Aldermen and
Bryan. Goede believed that the Police Department was being micromanaged
by City officials, requiring four signatures from City Hall for any purchase
above $25. Bryan cited the Board’s action as damaging to Departmental
moral. He was quoted, “Our officers are professionals and they want to do
their job. But this has people wondering if they’re going next” (Oliver 1995).
In April of 1995, two years after Bryan’s election, Fenton voters were
again asked to end the practice of electing a marshal in favor of an appointed
police chief. Fenton officials argued that moving to an appointed police chief
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would ensure a qualified person was running the Department. The
proposition read, “Should city officials have the authority to hire a qualified
chief of police rather than electing a city marshal” (Oliver 1995). Unlike
Youngman’s 1992 position, Bryan was against the proposed change. Bryan
believed that an appointed police chief would be beholden to elected officials
and could be fired for political reasons. Bryan was quoted, “That’s not good
for the city, but it is good for the people in power” (Sutin 1995). The proposal
passed with a 7% margin and was set to take effect after Bryan’s term ended
in 1997.
Also, in April of 1995, Fenton residents were voting for mayor. The
incumbent Mayor, Joe Maurath, ran against Alderman Fran Ruzicka. A news
article that ran during the race highlighted issues within the police
department. The article noted that since the Spring of 1994 five police officers
had resigned or been fired from the Department, which led some to claim a
power struggle was occurring between Maurath and the Marshal. Ruzicka
stated he was concerned about the proposed ballot measure to change the
selection of police chief because he feared it could lead to more scandal
through nepotism or other patronage. Maurath on the other hand favored
hiring a law enforcement consultant to recommend changes to the City and
the process to successfully select a police chief (Fitzmaurice 1995). Ruzicka
would go on to win the election.
From January of 1995 to April 4, 1995, a span of three months, Fenton
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officials had fired two police officers that garnered media attention to the
police department, the method of choosing the police chief was changed, and
a new mayor was elected. According to several of the interviewed officials,
personnel issues, particularly, the situation that led to the firing of Goede and
Allen directly contributed to the decision to contract police services with St.
Louis County. Goode and Allen were accused of sexual harassment along
with Bryan in one case.
In 1994, a Fenton Police Dispatcher filed a lawsuit alleging she was
sexually harassed by the former police officers and that Bryan promoted an
environment conducive to sexual harassment. The City of Fenton settled this
lawsuit in 1996 for $110,000 (Oliver 1996). Another incident occurred in
which two gas station employees alleged that the two former police officers
sexually harassed them in 1993 and 1994. Both employees alleged that the
officers made sexually explicit comments and one alleged that she was
touched inappropriately (Bradford 1996). The gas station employees filed a
lawsuit in February of 1995, which the City settled in 1996 for a total of
$160,000. One former City official described the Chief’s reaction to the
lawsuit brought by the gas station employees as callous, recalling he stated
that “boys will be boys,” in response to the allegations (personal interview,
July 8, 2015).
The lawsuits and complaints led to several closed door meetings of the
Board of Aldermen to discuss personnel issues and the police department.
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The City Attorney and a subset of aldermen approached the County Police
Department to ask for a proposal to police the City. The initial request and
discussions were done quietly, outside of the public eye. Several bureaucrats
close to the contract negotiations stated that the County was the only service
provider approached by the City. The proposal request from the County was
favored by those in the negotiation process. The proposal was then placed on
the agenda of Fenton’s Board of Aldermen.
On May 22, 1995, the Board of Aldermen, in a mostly closed session,
voted to terminate members of the police department and then voted to enter
into a five-year agreement with the County Police Department for patrol
services. The agreement cost $1,051,510 for the first year of service, and could
not be increased more than eight percent in subsequent years. Aldermen
denied that the decision was political and defended the closed-door nature of
the contracting discussions citing the myriad of personnel issues that
surrounded the decision.
News accounts related to the Board’s actions recount the speed with
which the change occurred and the reactions of some community members.
One article detailed the time officers were notified they had been fired, “The
officers learned at 7:10 p.m. Monday [May 22] they had been fired and would
receive two months severance pay” (Targovnik 1995). The Tuesday after the
decision, City Hall had received 50 to 60 calls from citizens regarding the
change (Fitzmaurice, 1995). One citizen, Holly McGarrahan was concerned
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the County Police would not be as engaged. McGarrahan was quoted, “We
always had police officers driving down the street, stopping, talking with the
kids…. We just don’t think we’ll have that with the county” (Targovnik 1995).
Yet, another resident, Rose Matejcic, did not believe the change would impact
the safety of the community (Targovnik 1995).
In news articles, Fenton officials called the move a cost-saving
measure. Valerie Adams, administrative assistant to the Mayor, was quoted,
“we will save $575,000 and probably get better service” (Fitzmaurice, 1995).
The City Attorney, Jerome Wallach, also couched the decision as financial.
Wallach was quoted, “It was a matter of fiscal responsibility…. Do you want
the city to go into debt?” (Targovnik 1995). The Wednesday following the
decision, Mayor Ruzicka sent a letter to residents. The Mayor’s letter was
quoted, “The Board of Aldermen and I have been faced with many difficult
decisions regarding the city’s future and its financial viability. The city’s
preliminary five-year financial projections indicate that the city will lose on
an average up to 1.5 million per year in sales tax revenue…” (Fitzmaurice
1995).
Others doubted that finances drove the City’s decision to contract
police services. Mac Scott, who was the spokesman for County Executive
George R. “Buzz” Westfall, doubted finances were behind the contracting
decision (Fitzmaurice 1995). Following the decision, the editorial board of the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch criticized the decision. The writers criticized the

78

secrecy of the contracting discussions and the lack of public involvement.
The editorial board also criticized the position statement of Alderman Jack
Lauer, who defended the board’s secrecy by citing personnel issues. The
editorial stated, “Getting rid of a city’s police department is more than a
personnel issue; it’s a restructuring of city services, one that should be open to
debate by residents” (St. Louis Post Dispatch Editorial Board 1995). The
editorial also called the assertion that Fenton made the decision solely for
financial reasons a “dubious assumption” and noted the City could find cost
savings without disbanding its police department. The editorial’s last
paragraph summarizes the matter:
Fenton’s flimsy rationales lead almost inescapably
to the conclusion that the board was motivated by
other reasons. The Fenton police department has
not been without controversy. And the wholesale
firing has spurred rumors of troubling problems
with the Fenton police. Is the real issue one of
professionalism and public safety? Fenton
residents have the right to get straight answers.
To summarize one former City bureaucrat interviewed regarding this matter,
underlying problems with the Police Department led to contracting
discussions, but the City latched onto the idea when leaders realized a cost
savings could also be obtained (personal interview, July 8, 2015).
Despite the editorials, the news articles, and a small amount of public
outcry, the decision was made and the City of Fenton was officially being
patrolled by the St. Louis County Police Department. A problem department
was disbanded and the City realized a cost savings as part of the process.
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Post-Contracting Decision
After receiving the contract for police services, the St. Louis County
Police appointed Timothy Fitch as the first commander of Fenton. A former
County Police leader described Fitch’s strong leadership abilities as a key to
success in Fenton (personal interview, January 27, 2015). After taking over
police services, the County Police took a neighborhood policing philosophy.
The use of neighborhood policing contributed to the success of the County
Police in Fenton. Fenton’s 1996 Annual Budget set out public safety goals that
included neighborhood watch programs and continued support and
participation in community policing programs. The budget also highlighted
the cooperative efforts made to establish community policing programs and
the ability of the City to deliver quality services more economically through
contracting (City of Fenton 1996).
Since contracting in 1995, Fenton has maintained a police services
contract with the County Police. In 1995, Fenton allocated thirty-two percent
of its budgeted general fund expenditures to police services. The general
fund budget allocation for police services averaged thirty percent for fiscal
years 1993-1997 (Chart 5.4). In 2015, Fenton’s budget allocation for police
services had increased to forty-seven percent of its budgeted general fund
expenditures. The 2015 budget allocation for police services was a minor
budgetary increase, three percent, over the previous year; and only a four
percent increase in the budgeted general fund expenditures since the 2011
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budget year (Chart 5.5). The 2015 police services agreement called for
twenty-one police officers, three sergeants, and one captain to be assigned to
the City.
Recently, the amount of revenue generated by municipalities from
their municipal courts has been an important discussion point in St. Louis
County. Fenton’s budget for revenue generated by the municipal court has
been low. In 1995, when the police contract was enacted, Fenton expected the
municipal court to generate two percent of its budgeted revenue. In fiscal
years 2011 through 2015, Fenton expected the municipal court to generate
three percent of its budgeted revenue on average.
In the past ten years, per capita crime rates in Fenton have trended
higher than the average for St. Louis County. In the past ten years, per capita
crime rates in St. Louis County have averaged .03 reported UCR crimes per
resident, while Fenton has averaged .11 reported UCR crimes per resident
(Chart 5.6).
The Fenton Policy Process and the Watchman Style
Of the municipalities studied in this paper, Fenton’s story is unique
because the City had an elected City Marshal prior to police contracting.
Additionally, shortly before contracting began, the long-time marshal left
office. Marshal Youngman’s statements coupled with the number of failed
ballot measures, which sought to change the marshal’s office, reveal
important characteristics of Fenton prior to the contracting decision. The
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ballot measures provide evidence that Fenton officials sought to modernize
and professionalize the police department years before contracting.
However, the efforts of City leaders were rebuffed by the voters. If
Youngman was to be believed, the citizens of Fenton voted down the ballot
measures because he was in office. Youngman’s lengthy tenure may have
prevented a policy window from opening when municipal leaders sought to
professionalize the Police Department. The failure of the ballot proposals
indicate that the mood of the citizens did not support changes to Department
management. The failed ballot measures indicate that the image held by the
electorate did not warrant the proposed changes.
Focusing Event
In late 1994 and early 1995, City leaders were aware of lawsuits
pending against the department. While City leaders had sought to change
the Department under Youngman, they failed at the ballot box. However, the
pending allegations of police misconduct and the insipid response by the
Marshal to address misconduct presented a true focusing event. Kingdon
argued that focusing events do not occur in a vacuum, rather they often
reinforce an existing problem. In the case of Fenton, City leaders were
already engaged in an effort to modify the police structure. The allegations of
misconduct drove City leaders to focus their efforts on exploring alternatives
to the existing police department. Additionally, the focusing event was
coupled with a shift in political mood, as indicated by the successful ballot
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measure.
Change in Image and Venue
In the spring of 1995, Youngman was replaced by a new City Marshal
and a new Mayor was elected. This created a change in the actors responsible
for decisions related to policing. The image of the police department had
changed within the community, as evidenced by the ballot measure and the
image of the police department was further tarnished in the eyes of City
leaders by the allegations of misconduct. This represents a change in venue
due to the changing actors and a change in image in how the Police
Department was viewed.
Watchman Style
Prior to contracting, the Fenton Police Department displayed
characteristics consistent with the watchman style of policing. Accounts by
prior police and City bureaucrats indicate that the city marshal would handle
complaints through informal methods. When the Board of Aldermen sought
to take personnel actions contrary to the Marshal’s wishes, it was said he
would simply rehire the officer.
The watchman style is characterized by an organization that does not
want to upset the status quo. Maintaining the status quo would have been
important for an elected marshal, who would have sought reelection and
would have wanted to curry favor with the electorate. The ballot initiative to
move from an elected marshal to an appointed police chief, is consistent with
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Wilson’s argument that a watchman style will often become a legalistic
department with the appointment of a reform police chief, who would seek to
institutionalize a set of professional standards. However, the City contract
with the County Police moved the policing style experienced in Fenton to the
service style displayed by the County. A highly professionalized police
agency came into the City and emphasized community relations and
community policing methods.
Conclusion
The Fenton case is supportive of the hypotheses. First, a focusing
event occurred, which drove the attention of City leaders to police issues and
resulted in an exploration of police service alternatives. Second, the City
experienced a change in venue and image in relation to the Police
Department that resulted in a dramatic shift in police policy. Third, the
Fenton Police Department displayed characteristics of the watchman style of
policing, which left it vulnerable to corruption and misconduct. The
misconduct of the City’s officers directly contributed to the vulnerability of
contracting.
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Chapter 6
Contract Municipality – Jennings
The City of Jennings is approximately 3.7 square miles and is located
in north St. Louis County. The City is nestled outside of the City of St. Louis
on the northern side of Interstate 70. Jennings was incorporated in 1946, a
time that saw an explosion of municipal incorporations. Jennings was one of
more than fifty municipalities that incorporated between 1945 and 1952
(Jones 2000, 30). The City’s name came from James Jennings, a slave-owning
farmer who settled the area in 1839 (Jennings Historical Society 2014).
Jennings population grew after annexation, peaking in the 1960 census
number, only to decrease (Chart 6.1). In 2010, the City’s population had
dropped below the 1950 census level of 15,282 residents to 14,712 residents
(United States Department of Commerce 1952 and 2012). The City has also
seen a dramatic shift in its demographic characteristics since incorporation
(Chart 6.2). In 1950, census figures indicated the City was one hundred
percent white. However, in the 2010 census, the white population of the city
had dropped to 9 percent.
Jennings is classified as a third-class city and has a mayor-council form
of government. The mayor is responsible for the management of the City and
serves a four-year term. The City is broken into four wards with two
representatives from each ward on the board of aldermen. Aldermen serve
two year terms.
Jennings is a “pool city,” which means it shares tax revenues on a per
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capita basis with other municipalities within St. Louis County. For fiscal
years 2011 through 2015, the City has averaged a general fund budget deficit,
general fund revenues have averaged $8,454,690 while general fund
expenditures have averaged $8,708,900 (Chart 6.3). The City began
contracting police service from the St. Louis County Police in 2011. Based
upon the City’s fiscal year 2011 budget, the average patrol officer salary was
approximately $36,526 before contracting with the County (City of Jennings
2010).
The Contracting Decision
West Florissant Avenue runs out of the City of St. Louis through
Jennings and continues into Ferguson. In the aftermath of the Ferguson
police involved of August 9, 2014, Jennings and Ferguson shared more than a
common street: at one time they each employed Darren Wilson, the officer
who was involved in the shooting. Wilson had worked at the Jennings Police
Department prior to Ferguson. The troubles that had faced the Jennings
Police Department suddenly made their way to the top news stories of
leading news outlets. A New York Times article that laid out Wilson’s life
stated that Jennings provided the formative experiences of Wilson’s policing
career and those experiences came in a Department rife with problems. The
article stated, “[the Department] wrestled historically with issues of racial
tension, mismanagement and turmoil” (Davey and Robles 2014). Another
article featured in the Washington Post had the emblazoned headline, “Darren
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Wilson’s first job was on a troubled police force disbanded by authorities”
(Leonnig, Kindy, and Achenbach 2014). The article’s first paragraph
described the former Jennings Police Department, “[the City] had a police
department so troubled, and with so much tension between white officers
and black residents, that the city council finally decided to disband it”
(Leonnig, Kindy, and Achenbach 2014).
The media accounts given regarding the Jennings Police Department
paint an exaggerated picture of the situation in Jennings prior to the decision
to contract police services from the County. Although exaggerated, these
media accounts demonstrate how the contracting decision in Jennings shaped
the perception of the police department. As one former County police
bureaucrat stated, Jennings decision to contract police service was rooted in a
crisis surrounding misappropriated grant money (personal interview, June 9,
2014). Yet another County police bureaucrat familiar with the contract
negotiations believed the decision to contract police services was made easier
through the discovery of fraudulently used grant money as well as an
incident of misapplied force and racial tensions between the Police
Department and the community (January 10, 2015).
Between 2007 and 2009, the Jennings Police Department received
grants from other governmental agencies to conduct overtime enforcement
operations related to driving while intoxicated (DWI) violations. In the
spring of 2010, it was discovered that thousands of dollars went to pay
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overtime to officers for conducting DWI enforcement operations in
accordance with the terms of the grant. However, DWI enforcement
operations were never actually conducted, meaning members of the Police
Department engaged in fraud.
Robert Orr was the Jennings Police Chief at the time of the DWI grant
misuse. Orr was a long-time Jennings Police Department employee who
worked his way up to lead the Department. Orr retired on Friday, October
29, 2010, during the investigation of the DWI grant fraud. Disavowing any
knowledge of the fraudulent activity, Orr was quoted in one news article as
saying, “Some accusations were made…that I should have known what was
going on, but that’s not possible because there were no checkpoints
performed in the last 2 1/2 years…there were no checkpoints to watch”
(Hollinshed 2010). Orr was defended by then Jennings Mayor Benjamin
Sutphin, who stated, “Chief Orr had nothing to do with this [DWI grant
fraud], and this has nothing to do with his retirement” (Hampel 2010).
In preparation of Orr’s retirement and in the wake of the DWI scandal,
City leaders requested the County Police Department appoint a County
Police captain as interim chief as well as conduct an in-depth analysis of
police operations. On November 1, 2010, County Police Captain Troy Doyle
assumed the position of interim chief overseeing police officers employed by
the Jennings Police Department. Doyle was the former commander of the
County’s North County Precinct who sought to strengthen neighborhood
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watch programs and hot-spot policing within Jennings (Hollinshed 2010).
Doyle’s initial term was slated to last until May 2011. Mayor Sutphin was
quoted, “Doyle will be in charge at least until we get this situation cleaned up
and the department straightened out” (Hampel 2010). Some worried that
Doyle’s presence was a step toward a County take-over, which was not ruled
out by Mayor Sutphin or Tim Fitch, the County’s Police Chief. Sutphin was
quoted,
“At the end of May, we’ll evaluate whether to hire
our own chief and continue with an independent
police department, or to ask the county to take
over completely…. Our officers were grumbling
that this was just a path to move them out in favor
of county officers. I told them that it wouldn’t
have to end up that way if they got their act
together” (Hampel 2010).
For his part, Chief Fitch was quoted, “at that point [in May of 2011], it will be
a matter of figuring out the cost…. If Jennings can afford it, we will provide
it” (Hampel 2010).
In early January of 2011, the Jennings Police Department was once
again receiving negative media attention after a police pursuit and the firing
of shots by a Jennings Police Officer. On Tuesday, January 4, 2011, a BelRidge police officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle containing two
females and a child. During the stop, a female passenger slid to the driver’s
seat and drove off, hitting the officer as she fled. Bel-Ridge officers initially
pursued the vehicle, but ended the pursuit due to the presence of a child in
the vehicle. A Jennings police officer encountered the vehicle and began a
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pursuit based upon police radio traffic that indicated the driver was wanted
for assaulting a police officer. The Jennings officer was not aware of the
presence of a child in the vehicle. During the pursuit, a Jennings officer
attempted to shoot out the vehicle’s tires. The attempt to shoot out the tires
failed. The chase came to an end in the City of St. Louis and the officer was
subsequently suspended (Bell 2011). The aftermath resulted in another
incident of questionable police practices by Jennings’ police officers.
City leaders initially indicated discussions of police contracting would
not happen until May of 2011, but those discussions happened months
earlier. On February 10, 2011, citizens crowded into a town hall meeting to
discuss the possibility of a County police contract. City officials presented a
list of contracting advantages and County officials promised the City could
maintain control, local identity, and that the move was not a County take
over. Contracting was expected to save the City money due to decreased
liability and legal expenses. Residents, including Jean Deeds, who had lived
in the City for forty-two years, wanted everything to stay the way it was.
One council member expressed concerns regarding the proposed County
contract (O’Connell 2011). Councilwoman Yolonda Fountain-Henderson did
not think the City should rush into a police contract. She was quoted, “I feel
like with the problems that we have, they can be fixed. The problem was
leadership, we can fix it as a community” (O’Connell 2011). Councilman
Rodney Epps supported the policing decision and was quoted, “We have bad
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policing here, and it costs us money…. We have a mess, why do you think the
county is here? If we didn’t have a mess, they wouldn’t be here” (O’Connell
2011).
Despite the concerns of residents and Councilwoman FountainHenderson, on February 28, 2011, the Jennings City Council voted 6-1 to hire
the County Police through a contractual agreement.

Councilwoman

Fountain-Henderson abstained from the vote. She had filed a lawsuit
attempting to block the contract decision and characterized the contract as a
take over (O’Connell 2011). Mayor Sutphin defended the contract citing the
problems with the in-house police agency. Another Councilman Dennis
Campbell was quoted following the decision, “It’s so easy to do the right
thing, it’s like a no-brainer for me” (O’Connell 2011). The contract began on
March 12, 2011.
As discussed, media accounts of the Jennings Police Department at the
time of the contracting decision largely focused on issues related to grant
funds and police misconduct. However, other issues have been identified as
factors in the contracting decision, namely potential collective bargaining of
police officers and racial tensions between the community and the police.
A City official close to the contracting process stated that while
corruption was the primary driver for the contracting decision, concerns of
unionization and collective bargaining also played into the decision. This
City stated that police officers had sought to unionize prior to the decision to
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contract. Fearing the possibility of unionization, Mayor Sutphin pushed for a
County police services contract to avoid unionization. A former police
bureaucrat stated that Jennings police officers wanted a collective bargaining
agreement that would strengthen disciplinary procedures. This official citied
the Mayor’s unwillingness to bargain as the primary driver of the contracting
decision. Solidifying disciplinary procedures was necessary because the
Department ran on a “good ol’ boy system,” in which disciplinary policies
and procedures were unfairly followed and enforced (personal interview,
October 30, 2015).
County and City officials close to the contracting process also cited
racial tensions between the City and the Police Department. The City had
seen a demographic shift that was not reflected in the police administration.
One City leader stated non-residents would avoid coming through Jennings
because the police would frequently stop motorists. Department members
were known to enforce the law with a heavy hand, with a particular focus on
traffic violations, which led to a disconnect between the police and local
youth. Despite the claims of racial tensions, a City leader observed the
Jennings Police Department knew members of the community, would stop
and speak with community members, and were visible (personal interview,
June 16, 2015). A former police official stated that the Jennings Police
Department would police fairly, but racial minorities were fearful of police
(personal interview, October 30, 2015).
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While unionization and racial tensions were not topics of discussion in
the media surrounding the contracting decision, they are important to note in
this paper. The fact that leaders observed these underlying issues are an
important note in understanding the undercurrents of the contracting
decision. The problem of unionization was solved by the County Police
because the County contract relieved the City of personnel issues. The
County also sought to improve police and community relations through
community policing strategies, such as neighborhood watch programs.
Post-Contracting Decision
After receiving the contract for police services, Captain Troy Doyle
remained the commander of Jennings. County police officers patrolling the
City were assigned cars marked “City of Jennings” and police patches specific
to Jennings were put on County Police uniforms in an effort to maintain local
identity. In Mayor Sutphin’s budget letter for fiscal year 2012, Sutphin stated,
“the contract with St. Louis County for police services resulted in savings in
both the general revenue and capital improvement fund” (City of Jennings
2011). The cost savings contributed to a two percent pay increase for full-time
employees.
A former County Police administrator stated that the County took an
active role in policing through community policing strategies. The County
police utilized data to determine the areas with the highest rates of crime and
then focused on policing those areas the hardest. The former administrator
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credited County’s community policing efforts as a factor that decreased crime
rates within the City (personal interview, January 10, 2015).
The initial contract divided the City into four beats, to be staffed
twenty-four hours per day and seven days per week. The contract provided
thirty-three commissioned officers from the County police, which consisted of
one (1) commanding officer, which was identified as a Lieutenant in the
original contract and later modified to Captain, six (6) sergeants, and twentysix (26) police officers (City of Jennings and St. Louis County, Missouri 2011
and 2015).
From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015, the percentage of the
general fund expenditures dedicated to supporting the police contract has
averaged thirty-three percent. The total general fund expenditures dedicated
to police and public safety expenses have increased since the inception of
contracting from the years immediately proceeding the contracting decision
(Chart 6.4). The City’s expected revenue from fines and fees has slightly
increased for budgets during the County Police contract.
In April of 2015, Fountain-Henderson, the former councilwoman who
attempted to gain a legal injunction against the police contract, was elected
Mayor of Jennings. In September of 2015, the newly-elected Mayor and
another councilwoman raised concerns regarding harassment of residents by
County police and a lack of patrols. Concerns regarding the lack of a bidding
process to award the police contract were also raised (Byers 2015). Later in
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the month, elected City leaders announced the police services contract would
be put out to bid in anticipation of the March 11, 2016 expiration date of the
County police services contract. During the announcement that the contract
would be put to bid, previously raised issues of County police performance
were downplayed. Rather, City officials said the contract had to be put to bid
in order to comply with City policies. A news article that ran regarding the
announcement described the public’s support for the County police. One
resident was quoted, “I don’t see personally how we can do any better than
St. Louis County” (Fowler 2015). The County police commander, Captain
Jeffrey Fuesting, pointed to decreasing crime rates and community support in
response to the announcement (Fowler 2015).
In the past ten years, per capita crime rates in Jennings have trended
higher than St. Louis County, but per capita crime rates have decreased in
recent years and have shown further decreases under the County police
contract. In the past ten years, per capita crime rates in St. Louis County have
averaged .03 reported UCR crimes per resident, while Jennings has averaged
.08 reported UCR crimes per resident (Chart 6.5).
The Jennings Policy Process and the Watchman Style
The Jennings case supports the hypotheses of this paper. There were
two focusing events as well as a change in image and venue. Prior to
contracting, the Jennings Police Department displayed characteristics
associated with the watchman style of policing.
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Focusing Event
Jennings had two independent focusing events that contributed to the
contracting decisions. Jennings Police had long grumbled about low pay and
high work demands. In 2005, Jennings faced a growing crime rate, an
increase in violent crime, and a police force demanding higher pay (Cambria
2005).

Yet, the City did not contract and in 2010 the City’s police officers

made an average of $10,000 less than the County average for police officers
working in other municipalities (St. Louis County 2010). In 2005, Robert Orr
was the Police Chief. Orr was still at the helm of the Department when his
employees corruptly obtained overtime funds between 2007 and 2009 and
when the investigation came to light in 2010. The fraudulent receipt of grant
money associated with DWI enforcement efforts served as Jenning’s first
focusing event. This event led to the retirement of Orr and the installation of
a County police bureaucrat to oversee and evaluate the Department’s policies
and procedures.
The installation of a County commander, was the first step in opening
the policy window. First, a focusing event occurred, which defined the
institution as problematic. Second, the political forces in the City of Jennings
supported changing the manner in which the Police Department ran when
they asked the County to oversee and evaluate the police situation. Third, the
installation of County Police commander, put into place a new set of policy
specialists. During the initial discussions surrounding the installation of the
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County Police Captain, the County Police Chief was already discussing
contracting in the media, laying a foundation for the subsequent outcome.
The second focusing event was the misapplied use of force by a
Jennings police officer. A little over a month later, the City decided to
contract police services. This second focusing event further illuminated both
procedural and personnel issues with the Jennings Police Department and
opened the City to another potential lawsuit. All of these issues could be
solved through a County Police contract. The County invested time and
resources explaining the potential benefits of contractual police provision.
The corruption within the Department opened the policy window, but the
misapplied use of force kept the policy window open for a longer period of
time, which further increased the chances for contracting.
Change in Image and Venue
The decision to contract police services in Jennings was accompanied
by a change in image and venue during a period of destabilization. The
change in image occurred in the wake of the two focusing events. The image
of the Department was shaped by the focusing events, leaving a dark cloud of
corruption and unprofessionalism over the Department.
A change in venue can be characterized as a change in the institutions
that control policy issues. In this instance, City leaders invited the County
Police to appoint a police commander to oversee the Department. This
appointment was done after news of the misapplied grant funds broke and
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the police chief resigned, which led to instability. Once County command
was in place, the policies and practices of the Department were scrutinized.
The presence of County Police commander during the second focusing event
allowed the County control the policy narrative. When Councilman Epps
pointed to bad policing by the municipal Department, he referred to the
County as an agency that was brought in to handle a policy problem.
Watchman Style
The Jennings Police Department prior to contracting displayed
attributes associated with the watchman style of policing. The Department
was described as one that frequently enforced traffic regulations with a heavy
hand, particularly on those from outside the City. While the watchman style
is described as having a focus on order maintenance over formal law
enforcement action, the watchman style left room for aggressive policing in
certain areas, such as traffic enforcement, particularly with a select group of
individuals such as outsiders driving through the municipality. The
watchman style also described the police as withdrawing from relationships
with African-American citizens, which could lead to a perception of racial
tensions. Jennings displayed attributes of the watchman style in the methods
of police enforcement.
Jennings also displayed attributes of the watchman style in the
organizational context. Watchman style departments are characterized by
low pay. Jennings officers were paid salaries lower than the County average
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for municipal officers. A small police agency, such as Jennings, limited the
ability to develop specialization and advanced training opportunities, which
is characteristic of a watchman style department. Lack of oversight and
standardized procedures are also typical of watchman style departments.
The lack of oversight was demonstrated in the DWI grant scandal when the
Police Chief admitted his lack of knowledge in the fraud related to DWI
grants.
Policy Entrepreneur
Jennings is the first example where the County’s actions reflect those of
a policy entrepreneur. A policy entrepreneur is an organization or individual
willing to expend resources in the hopes of obtaining a policy they favor. The
County favored a police contract and the investment of a full-time police
commander, although reimbursed, helped ensure an outcome favorable to
the County. The County commander not only oversaw the Department, but a
comprehensive examination of the Department’s operations was undertaken.
The County also invested time and resources preparing a proposal for police
services and explaining the potential benefits of contractual police provision.
Conclusion
The Jennings case further substantiates the hypotheses. Jennings was
the subject of an investigation concerning the fraudulent use of DWI grant
funds, which acted as a focusing event that drew attention to corruption
within the department. This focusing event led to a change in image and
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venue and the appointment of a County commander to oversee the agency.
A second focusing event, further changed the image of the agency and
allowed for policy entrepreneurs and experts to further frame the agency as
unprofessional.
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Chapter 7
Contract Municipality: Dellwood
Jennings and Dellwood were both incorporated during a time of
explosive growth in the number of municipalities incorporating between 1945
and 1952. Dellwood’s incorporation came at the tail end of this period of
municipal growth, with incorporation in the year 1951. Dellwood is classified
as a fourth class city. The City covers 1.03 square miles of territory in north
St. Louis County. The first census after incorporation, the 1960 census,
showed the City’s population at 4,713 (United States Department of
Commerce 1961). The 1970 census showed a peak in the City’s population at
7,137 (United States Department of Commerce 1973), however, the City’s
population began decreasing in subsequent census years and had dropped to
5,025 residents in the 2010 census (United States Department of Commerce
2012) (Chart 7.1). Like Jennings, Dellwood has seen a dramatic demographic
shift since incorporation. In the 1960 census the City was 97% white, while
the 2010 census showed a white population of 18% (United States
Department of Commerce 1961 and 2012) (Chart 7.2).
As a fourth class city, the City has elected to be governed by a mayorcity administrator-aldermen form of government. The City is broken into
four wards with two aldermen elected from each ward. Unlike Fenton and
Jennings, Dellwood has a city administrator who is responsible for
supervising City operations. The City participates in the sales tax pool and
has had a mostly balanced budget in the past five fiscal years (Chart 7.3).
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In the 2010 survey of County police departments, Dellwood reported
having a force of seventeen officers (St. Louis County 2010). Dellwood began
contracting police services from the County Police Department in 2012.
The Contracting Decision
In April of 2011, former alderwoman Loretta Johnson was elected
mayor of Dellwood. Johnson was Dellwood’s first African American mayor.
She replaced Jack Agnew, who had served as Dellwood’s mayor for twelve
years. One former City bureaucrat described the operation of the City as a
mom and pop shop in which the police department did not operate under a
set of formalized rules and regulations. The Mayor hired a new city
administrator who found several problems with City management. Attempts
were made by the Mayor and newly appointed administrator to modernize
and professionalize City departments, only to receive push back from
entrenched bureaucrats (personal interview, January 2, 2015).
The Dellwood Police Department was described as an agency with
several internal problems in early 2011. There were rifts between officers
motivated by race. The ability to discipline officers was obstructed by
personal relationships within the Board of Aldermen. When disciplinary
actions would go before the aldermen, officers would employ their personal
relationships in such a way as to thwart severe disciplinary action. The
ability to influence disciplinary proceedings was particularly beneficial to
three or four officers who were frequently the subject of complaints.
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Despite the internal problems brewing within the police department,
officers were paid at a level similar to their colleagues in other municipal
departments. In 2010, the average salary for a police officer in Dellwood was
$46,795 while the average pay for a municipal police officer in St. Louis
County was $46,154 (St. Louis County 2010). The Department consisted of
sixteen officers with an average of twelve years of service (Walker 2011).
After the April election, City leaders attempted to hold a hiring
process for the Department, with a focus on recruitment of not only qualified
applicants, but also minority applicants. The process did not net the results
City leaders had hoped. In the fall of 2011, City leaders stealthily approached
the St. Louis County Police to discuss the possibility of contracting police
services.
A former City official speculated racism was behind the initial contract
discussions. When the Mayor took office, the department had a small
number of minority officers. It was believed that Mayor Johnson sought to
replace the internal department in hopes of gaining more minority officers,
which would reflect the changing demographics of Dellwood. The official
stated the negative information that was published about the Dellwood Police
Department was trumped up to tarnish the reputation of the Department
(personal interview, May 20, 2015).
News of the potential contract began to spread in late November. On
Monday, November 28, 2011, residents crowded into a council meeting to
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express their support for the Dellwood Police Department. One resident
collected signatures in support of the Police Department. A news account of
the meeting summarized the comments made by many residents in
attendance, “[Residents said] the officers were more like family than a city
service…telling stories of officers helping them with personal problems,
checking on them after accidents or family deaths, and knowing them on a
level that made them feel safer” (Walker 2011). At the meeting, the City
Attorney Donnell Smith cited personnel issues as the rationale for exploring
contracting options with St. Louis County and that the process was just
beginning. Mayor Johnson refused to comment since the decision revolved
around personnel matters. Chief Fitch of the County Police indicated City
leaders had approached the County approximately two weeks prior to
November 28 (Walker 2011).
After the open forum, the council went into closed session. During the
closed session, Police Chief Fred Haunold was placed on administrative
leave. The City agreed to pay the salary of a County Police lieutenant and the
County agreed to provide a sergeant at no cost to the City. The agreement
called for the County to oversee the police department (Walker 2011).
In the wake of these discussions and the replacement of police
leadership, police members went door to door seeking support for the
Department. Aldermen reported that some citizens feared supporting the
switch to St. Louis County because they felt threatened by the door to door
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campaign. Alderwoman Dawnn Tanksley was quoted, “They [the residents]
were terrified…I had to assure them that it would be okay. That didn’t do any
good - they were still afraid…The day they started canvassing, I had several
residents that were offended and afraid…like they were being targeted. They
were intimidated” (Rivas 2011).
On December 7, 2011, a town hall was held with several hundred
residents in attendance, the majority supported keeping an independent
Dellwood police agency. City Administrator Frank Myers defended the
aldermen’s decision to explore a police contract option citing several
concerns, including increased crime rates, personnel issues, improper
handling of evidence, and improper reporting of crime statistics to state and
federal authorities. While City leaders and aldermen explored a County
police contract, some aldermen were skeptical. Alderman James Lovings
called for the matter to be placed on the ballot (Walker 2011).
The next day, on December 8, 2011, a special session was called to vote
on dissolving the Police Department and contracting with the County.
However, no vote was taken because the requisite number of aldermen for a
quorum was lacking. This session foreshadowed a months long stand-off and
legal battle between aldermen trying to prevent a County takeover and those
willing to dissolve the Department.
After news of a potential County takeover became public, police
officers began applying for jobs with the County. Several of Dellwood’s

105

fifteen officers were hired by the County Police in the wake of the
announcement. This led to a dire situation for police protection in Dellwood,
which resulted in the Mayor ordering a state of emergency because the City
lacked enough police officers to adequately patrol the City.
On Monday, January 10, 2012, the Mayor asked the County Police to
cover some police patrols in the City. The Mayor was quoted, “our city has
become unable to conduct normal business and our citizens will suffer
without assistance” (Currier 2012). The County agreed to patrol the City
during day shifts. However, County police officers would only be able to
enforce state laws. As a practical matter, this meant County officers would
not write traffic tickets or handle other low level nuisance crimes, such as
abandoned vehicles (Currier 2012).
The County Police Chief acknowledged that residents may have a hard
time accepting the presence of County officers. He was quoted, “We fully
expect that people will be against us and will test us…. We know there are
people hoping and praying that we screw up” (Currier 2012). Alderman
James Lovings, who protested the County contract by boycotting council
meetings, was a vocal critic of the proposed change. Lovings argued that the
dwindling police force was the only way to ensure support for a contract.
Lovings was quoted, “The only way (Johnson) could get St. Louis County to
Dellwood was to get our officers gone…. The way to get them gone was to
lean on Chief Fitch to take our officers” (Currier 2012). Lovings argued that
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the matter of a police contract should be put before the residents on the next
municipal ballot.
In the media accounts surrounding the County patrols, County
Sergeant Dave Kopfensteiner, stated issues had been discovered with
Dellwood’s evidence procedures. Particularly, Dellwood had not sent
evidence that required analysis by the crime laboratory. This information
foreshadowed additional revelations of a County audit that would cast a dark
shadow on the competency of the Department.
In late January of 2012, additional revelations were made about
mishandling of evidence by the Dellwood Police Department. A newspaper
account summarized the problems: “In the audit, St. Louis County police
allege that Dellwood officers sold copper tubing from the police evidence
locker to a copper scrap yard…evidence had been destroyed or was never
returned to its owner…[and] guns had been taken from the locker by officers
for personal use (Walker 2012).” In the same newspaper account Chief Fitch
praised Dellwood officials for bringing the matter to light while Alderman
Lovings, one of the four Aldermen boycotting council meetings, defended the
Police Department (Walker 2012).
Almost a month later, in late February of 2012, news was released that
the Dellwood police had mishandled cases, to include egregious crimes such
as reported cases of rape. The County reported that between 2009 and 2011,
121 cases were mishandled. In many cases, the initial report and follow-up
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work generated leads that led to a suspect, but Department members failed to
complete the case and seek a warrant for the subject’s arrest. A news article
presenting the mishandling of cases to the public cited a woman, Felicia
Vanderford, whose son had been murdered in the City. Vanderford
described how she was contacted by police during the homicide
investigation. She was told that police had conducted an investigation and a
suspect had been developed. However, the subject was not arrested and had
not been prosecuted (Walker 2012).
Former City officials argued the report of mishandled cases was blown
out of proportion. These officials cited a lack of witnesses and victim
cooperation as the primary reason warrants were not applied for by
detectives. Officials argued that this was an easy way to further tarnish the
reputation of the police unnecessarily. One former official pointed out that
St. Louis County had unsolved cases and that their policing methods may not
result in successful prosecutions in all cases (personal interview, May 20,
2015).
Despite several months of negative reporting about Dellwood police,
four aldermen continued to boycott council meetings. On April 3, 2012, a
municipal election was held leading to the election of three new aldermen
and the reelection of an incumbent. Two of the boycotting aldermen, Richard
Culberson and Donald Haynes, were replaced. Culberson did not seek
reelection and Haynes was unseated. James Lovings, a boycotting aldermen
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was reelected. Nine days after the election, the stalemate came to an end and
the board approved a contract with the County police. The measure passed
5-3. Newly elected Alderman Ellis Fitzwalter and previously boycotting
aldermen Lovings and Karen Bober voted against the measure.
Dellwood elected police service from St. Louis County, but unlike the
other municipalities studied, Dellwood received a second proposal from
Ferguson, a neighboring municipality. The two proposals were vastly
different. The County proposed a contract that would cost approximately
$1.3 million annually, while Ferguson proposed a contract that would cost
approximately $621,000 annually. The County proposal would assign twelve
officers to the City of Dellwood while Ferguson would hire six additional
officers. Ferguson’s officers would be assigned beats that covered Dellwood,
but would not be primarily responsible for policing Dellwood. Then
Ferguson Police Chief Tom Jackson was quoted, “We’d be adding people to
each platoon and changing our beat plan to maximize our response times and
efficiency” (Byers 2012).
Post Contracting Decision
Dellwood has continued contracting with County Police since
beginning the contract in 2012. An amendment to the contract was executed
in June of 2015 because the City elected to remove the lieutenant position.
The County would still provide twelve officers and a sergeant. In post
contracting fiscal years, the percentage of general fund expenditures
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dedicated to contracting has averaged fifty-five percent (55%).
A few people interviewed described the County Police as being purely
“reactive.” The officers assigned to the City were spending their time outside
of City assisting with other calls for service being handled by the County
Police. The former Dellwood Police Department was described as being
present and visible, driving down every street every day, but that daily
presence was lacking with the County Police (personal interview, May 20,
2015).
Since contracting with St. Louis County, the City has seen an increase
in reported crime. In the last ten years, the City saw a spike in reported crime
since 2011 (Chart 7.4). In 2010, there were .04 reported UCR crimes per
resident and .01 reported violent crimes per resident. In 2014, there were .07
reported UCR crimes per resident and .02 reported violent crimes per
resident.
The Dellwood Policy Process and the Watchman Style
Dellwood’s path to a police contract had the most drama of any of the
municipalities studied. The contracting process took almost four months,
with a persistent media narrative that the existing department was
unprofessional while four aldermen boycotted meetings. Despite the drama
associated with the contracting decision, Dellwood’s path to contracting is
supportive of the hypotheses.
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Focusing Event
Dellwood represents a variation of a focusing event when a symbol
emerges and diffuses. In these instances, as with all focusing events, an
underlying issue, such as an unprofessional City department is coupled with
a focusing event. However, instead of the traditional focusing event, a
symbol emerges and then the issue spreads. In the case of Dellwood the
Department became a symbol of an unprofessional police agency. The
unprofessionalism began to diffuse as the St. Louis County Police began to
audit the department and uncover issues. As the County began uncovering
issues, the web of problems grew wider and culminated when attention was
called to the mishandling of egregious violent crimes.
Change in Image and Venue
The Dellwood case exemplifies a change in venue and image. The
first change in venue occurred when Mayor Johnson was elected and hired a
new city administrator. The venue continued to change when the County
police were asked to provide oversight of the Department. The addition of a
new administrator and the invitation of County police into municipal affairs
changed the authorities that were responsible for making decisions regarding
police policies.
A change in image occurred as the County Police began conducting
audits of the Department. The negative reporting concerning the
investigative abilities of the Dellwood Police Department changed the tone
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surrounding the Department. The narrative about the Department changed
to unprofessionalism.
Despite the initial change in venue and image, a change in police
service did not immediately occur because of the boycotting aldermen. The
change in service providers did not occur until another venue change
occurred after the April 2012 municipal elections when the Board of
Aldermen was reshaped, which allowed for a police contract agreement.
Watchman Style
Similar to the other municipalities studied, the Dellwood Police
Department displayed characteristics of the watchman style. The politics of
the watchman style are marked by a lack of political willpower to
professionalize and modernize the police department, in part because of poor
city administration. The City of Dellwood suffered from a “mom and pop”
attitude toward city administration for years prior to the election of Mayor
Johnson. This attitude carried over to the police department. Political
willpower to professionalize the department did not exist. Even during the
initial contract negotiations when unprofessional actions by police were made
public, political willpower was lacking.
The police chief prior to the decision to contract had a long tenure with
the Department, which is consistent with the watchman style. Officers lacked
specialization despite pay that was on par with the average pay of other
municipal police departments throughout the County. The Department had a

112

small detective bureau. However, as the County audit discovered, detectives
did an inadequate job on investigations.
Policy Entrepreneur
Similar to Jennings, the County police acted as a policy entrepreneur in
the Dellwood case. The County police were provided legitimacy in
reviewing Dellwood when they were invited into the City and asked to
conduct a review of the existing police agency based upon their expertise.
The County’s presence helped move the agenda of contracting forward in
two visible ways. First, the County audit uncovered deficiencies in the
existing police service. Second, the introduction of the County police helped
create a shortage in Dellwood’s ability to field enough police officers to serve
the town. This allowed the County to provide officers to cover the day shift
and introduced them into the day to day operations related to policing the
City.
When the topic of police contracting was first discussed, Dellwood
residents spoke out against disbanding Dellwood’s police force. When
additional officers were needed to police the City, the County police provided
resources to fill the void. After agreeing to provide officers, County Police
Chief Fitch was quoted, “We fully expect people will be against us…so we
have to be prepared to become immediately subjected to scrutiny” (Currier
2012). The quote exemplifies the policy entrepreneur role of the County
because resources were provided in the hopes of swaying citizen opinions
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about police services. If citizens who were previously critical of County
Police were able to interact with County Police, it may result in a positive
shift in public opinion. A positive shift in public opinion could quell critical
voices.
Conclusion
Dellwood’s march toward police contracting has the most drama of the
case studies presented in this paper. A new mayor sought to professionalize
City services and in the process brought in a larger Department to oversee
and review the practices of the police, which resulted in a new narrative of an
unprofessional police agency. However, attempts to contract police services
led to a boycott by members of the Council. After a municipal election a year
after the Mayor’s election, a vote was finally taken to contract police services.
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Chapter 8
Non-Contract Municipality: Rock Hill
Rock Hill is one of two case studies in which police contracting was
discussed and debated, but not implemented. Rock Hill was incorporated in
1929. The City was given its name by a Presbyterian minister who
encountered two steep and rocky hills while going to the area to celebrate a
service (City of Rock Hill).
The City is classified as a fourth class city and covers a little over one
square mile in the middle of the County. The City is bisected by Manchester
Road. Between the 1940 and 1970 census the City’s population grew from a
low of 1,821 residents to a high of 7,275 residents (United States Department
of Commerce 1943 and 1973). After 1970, the City’s population began to
decline to 4,635 residents in the 2010 census (Chart 8.1) (United States
Department of Commerce 2012). In the last thirty years, the City has not
experienced a large demographic shift (Chart 8.2).
As a fourth class city, the City has elected to be governed by a mayorcity administrator-aldermen form of government. The City is broken into
three wards with two aldermen elected from each ward. The City is a point
of sale City, which relies on sales taxes for a significant portion of its general
fund revenue. The City has had a general revenue fund deficit in four of the
past five fiscal years (Chart 8.3).
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The Contracting Decision
In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the City of Rock Hill had a very tight, but
balanced budget (Chart 8.4). As a former City bureaucrat stated, the City was
looking at the possibility of bankruptcy in the years before 2004 if the
situation of tight budgets continued and expenditures continued to grow. As
a dire financial situation griped the City, leaders began to examine all services
in an effort to cut expenditures in anticipation of the 2004 fiscal year (personal
interview, July 8, 2015).
Part of the dire financial situation in the City was caused by a push to
construct a civic center expected to cost over ten million dollars. The effort
was spearheaded by then Mayor Robert Salamone. A large part of the City’s
reserve funds were expended to finance the initial planning stages of the civic
center. The City had also failed to attract a Wal-Mart store, which would
have bolstered tax revenue.
The examination of City departments included the twelve-man police
department. In 2004, the median Rock Hill police officer salary was $48,250.
As a cost saving measure, police contracting was discussed. Rock Hill did not
examine a change to police services because of unprofessionalism or
corruption. Rather, the police were simply another City department that
needed examination in a larger effort to reduce expenditures.
City leaders initially approached the St. Louis County Police as part of
their review. The County was asked to develop a plan to police the City and
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determine the associated costs. One former City bureaucrat stated the
County prepared a good proposal.
In May of 2004, news broke that the City was examining the possibility
of police contracting. Reactions to the possibility of contracting police
services were overwhelmingly negative. David Arnold, a resident was
quoted, “how can we build a civic center if we can’t pay for our police”
(Sparks 2004)? Other residents defended the Rock Hill Police believing
outside police agencies would not be as effective. Another resident, Tim
Sheahan was quoted, “our police know who the bad guys are and they know
what’s going on” (Sparks 2004). Rumors were also circulating that contracted
police services would result in increased police response times and decreased
police presence and proactive patrols.
Despite the support for the police department, City leaders,
particularly Don Cary, the City Finance Director, argued the City had to
examine expenses because of the dire financial situation. On May 26, 2004,
the City held a special meeting to discuss the proposed changes. At the
meeting the financial situation was discussed. Cary believed the City would
face a deficit budget by fiscal year 2007 if changes were not made. It was
estimated that contracting police services from the County would save an
average of $300,000 annually. The County police proposed assigning a
lieutenant to oversee the municipality and five patrol cars.
One former City bureaucrat recalled a Rock Hill police officer standing
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in the back of a meeting in which contracting was discussed. The officer
stood at the back of the meeting holding an infant telling the residents he was
going to lose his job leading to an inability to care for his child (personal
interview, July 8, 2015).
The pressure against contracting was too great, which led the Council
to back down. Instead of contracting, the Police Department agreed to
pursue cost cutting measures. The Council also agreed to allow a buyout of
long term employees.
Following the Decision Not to Contract Out
In the years following the contracting discussion, the City’s general
fund revenues outpaced general fund expenditures (Chart 8.4). The
percentage of general fund expenditures dedicated to the police department
fell from 32% in fiscal year 2004 to 26% in fiscal year 2006. The proposed
convention center was not completed.
One interviewee stated that many residents felt Mayor Salamone
attempted to ruin the City of Rock Hill (personal interview, May 12, 2015).
After leaving office, Salamone faced corruption charges for receiving kick
backs from a pension fund company that took over service to the City during
Salamone’s tenure.
In the ten years since the decision not to contract, the per capita crime
rate has remained relatively study. The per capita crime rate for Rock Hill
has remained lower than that of St. Louis County (Chart 8.5).
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The Rock Hill Policy Process
Rock Hill discussed contracting police services from the County, but
did not actually contract. The Rock Hill case supports the hypotheses
through negative findings. Rock Hill had a focusing event, but it did not
concern the Police Department. The image and venue of the Police
Department did not change. Throughout the contracting discussions the
professional abilities of the Police Department were not questioned.
Historical references and interviewees failed to provide an adequate picture
of Rock Hills’ police style. Therefore, the third hypothesis concerning police
styles could not be satisfactorily answered.
Focusing Event
In Rock Hill, a specific incident did not focus attention on the police
department. Rather, budget constraints created a focusing event surrounding
the City’s budget and future fiscal position. The focusing event was a catalyst
to reexamine service provision and the civic center backed by the Mayor.
Focusing events do not occur in a vacuum, they must have
accompaniment. Unlike the successful contracting examples, the focusing
event did not specifically center upon the Police Department and lacked
accompanying concerns or issues related to the Department. In Rock Hill,
residents and leaders did not have a preexisting perception of a problem
related to the Police Department. As one former County police leader stated,
Rock Hill, provided a quality police service (personal interview, May 21,
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2015). Residents could not accept a solely budgetary rationale for disbanding
local police control.
Budgetary concerns can constrain policy and promote policy (Kingdon
1995, 106). In the case of Rock Hill, budgetary concerns promoted a policy
discussion concerning police contracting. Rock Hill’s focusing event included
the Police Department, but was not defined by the Police Department. In this
instance, the focusing event drew attention to the proposed civic center.
Citizens were not willing to exchange municipal services for a civic center.
The focusing event also caused City leaders to reduce expenditures in
individual departments.
Change in Image and Venue
The period leading up to Rock Hill’s contracting discussions was not a
period of instability. The image and venue of the Police Department was
stable throughout the contracting discussion period.
Rock Hill lacked a change in both image and venue during the
discussion of police contracting. Negative information regarding the police
department was not revealed during the contracting discussion. The image
of the police department as a good service provider was not shaken.
Unlike other municipalities, Rock Hill lacked a change in actors during
the contracting discussions. The County was not called in to oversee or audit
the police department. A new mayor or city administrator did not enter the
picture advocating a change to police services.
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Conclusion
Elected Rock Hill leaders wanted to build a civic center during a time
when bureaucrats were forecasting a dire fiscal position for the future of the
City. City leaders began to consider options to cut expenditures, which led to
a discussion of the possibility of contracting police services from St. Louis
County. The focusing of attention to contracting was not precipitated out of a
police issue. The venue and image surrounding the police department was
stable and there were no changes to either. Residents did not support the
civic center plan and did not support police contracting. City leaders were
able to take actions to cut expenditures and the civic center was not
constructed. In the end, the Rock Hill Police Department was maintained.
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Chapter 9
Non-Contract Municipality: Hazelwood
Of the municipalities studied, Hazelwood has the largest population
and land area. The City was one of the rash of municipal incorporations in
the late forties and early fifties, incorporating in the year 1949. The City is
located in north St. Louis County covering a little over sixteen square miles.
Since incorporating, the City has grown in size and population. In the 1950
census, the population numbered 336 and had grown to 25,703 in the 2010
census (Chart 9.1) (United States Department of Commerce 1943 and 2012).
In the past thirty years, Hazelwood has seen a demographic shift, but not to
the extent of Jennings and Dellwood. The City’s population was 87% white
during the 1980 census and 64% white in the 2010 census (Chart 9.2) (United
States Department of Commerce 1982 and 2012).
Hazelwood is a home rule city, which means the City has drafted and
adopted a charter outlining a structure of government specific to the City.
Hazelwood operates under the council-manager plan of governance. In the
council-manager form of governance, cities employ a professionally trained
administrator to manage the day to day operation of the City. A weak mayor
primarily serves as the political leader of the city, but lacks administrative
authority.
Like Fenton, Hazelwood is a point-of-sale City that also participates in
the County’s sales tax pool in areas incorporated after 1983. In the last five
fiscal years, the budgeted general fund revenue has averaged over thirty
122

million dollars while general fund expenditures have averaged a little over
twenty-four million dollars. Revenues outpaced expenditures every year
(Chart 9.3).
The Contracting Discussion
In 1948, the St. Louis Ford automobile plant moved to Hazelwood, by
2002, the plant employed more than 2,600 workers (Gillerman and
Schlinkman 2002). In 2002, Ford was facing declining profits. The company,
announced that the Hazelwood plant faced closure. The possibility of losing
revenue associated with the plant caused City leaders to discuss potential cost
saving measures. One of those measures, was a consideration to contract
police services from the St. Louis County Police.
The potential economic impact of losing the Ford plant could have
significant consequences on the City’s budget. If the Ford plant closed, the
City faced a potential decrease in revenue of twenty percent (Gillerman and
Schlinkman 2002).
In anticipation of losing revenue, the City obtained a proposal for
police services from the St. Louis County Police. A former City leader
recalled two council members wanted to explore the idea of contracting
police services. These two council members thought the discussion could
occur out of the public forum. The City Manager was asked to explore
contracting options (personal interview, November 20, 2015). One former
County police administrator recalled Hazelwood Police Chief Carl Wolfe
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made the initial inquiry regarding a potential contract (personal interview,
January 10, 2015). Initial news the of proposal was circulated in an
anonymous e-mail. The anonymous e-mail caused the City’s Communication
Manger, Deb Faber, to confirm that a proposal was received, but any
decisions on disbanding the Police Department would require significant
discussion and that the discussions would be rooted in the budget (Posorske
2002).
On May 14, 2002, County Police Lieutenant Ken Cox presented the
County’s proposal to police Hazelwood to the City Council. The County
proposed a $3.6 million contract to provide police services. The County’s
proposal was significantly less than the $5.6 million Hazelwood was
spending on police services. During the meeting, Mayor Carr made it clear
that the meeting was simply an information session (Harris 2002).
News of a potential police contract did not sit well with members of
the community or members of the police department. A campaign was
started to save the department and dubbed a “Blue Ribbon Campaign”
because community and police members were asked to wear blue ribbons to
City Council meetings to show support for the Police Department. Members
of the Police Department also began touting the professionalism of the
department. Russ Craven, a police officer, was quoted as saying, “The
Hazelwood Police Department is one of the most respected, professional and
progressive police departments in the region” (“Hazelwood police officers
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rally to save department” 2002).
On May 15, 2002, over five hundred residents showed up at a meeting
of the City Council. The Council rejected the County’s policing proposal. In
response, Mayor Carr noted that the proposal was not a formal action item
and expressed contentment that the residents would support a revenue
increase (Harris and Porsorske 2002). A former City leader stated that the
cost savings from a County contract would have been marginal if Hazelwood
was to maintain the same level of police services that were provided
internally. However, the City would not have known if a County police
contract was a viable option without exploring the matter (personal
interview, November 20, 2015).
While the County’s proposal to provide police services was rejected,
City leaders were still concerned about the impending plant closure and the
possible loss of revenue. In the City Manager’s fiscal year 2003 budget
proposal, the news of the Ford plant closure loomed large. In the budget
prepared for fiscal year 2003, department heads cut $1.2 million from their
operating budgets. As part of the cuts, five vacant full-time employees were
cut. Two of those cuts came from the Police Department (City of Hazelwood
2002).
One former County police administrator believed that Hazelwood
used the County. The County prepared a patrol plan for the City as part of its
proposal. The former administrator believed Hazelwood simply took the
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plan and used it as a blueprint and implemented the suggested changes in an
effort to save money (personal interview, January 10, 2015).
One former City leader believed that the people of Hazelwood had a
deep conviction that municipalities should provide their own police service.
This leader pointed to Hazelwood’s annexation efforts in the nineties. During
those annexation efforts, Hazelwood leaders had Hazelwood police officers
patrol areas that were to be annexed. Residents in soon to be annexed areas
began to see Hazelwood police with greater frequency than they had seen
County police. At that time, flyers were produced touting the superiority of
public services provided by the City. The policing efforts demonstrated by
the City during the annexation discussions resulted in a service standard
citizens expected. Unincorporated citizens, who were later annexed, wanted
to be served by the Hazelwood police because they could recall lackluster
service by the County police (personal interview, November 20, 2015).
In 2006, the Ford plant closed. Hazelwood still maintains its own
Police Department, which is staffed by sixty-nine officers. In the last ten
years, the per capita crime rate in Hazelwood has been slightly higher than
the rest of St. Louis County (Chart 9.4).
The Hazelwood Policy Process and the Service Style
Hazelwood’s contracting discussion resembled Rock Hill’s because
both City’s examined police service options in the face of a budget crisis. The
Hazelwood case is also supportive of the hypotheses. Hazelwood lacked a
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focusing event specific to the police department and a change in image and
venue. The Police Department displayed characteristics closely associated
with the service style.
Focusing Event
Hazelwood’s focusing event was the announcement that the Ford
plant would close by mid-decade. This event, focused the attention of City
leaders on budgetary matters. The City’s concerns regarding the budget
focused attention on all City departments, to include the Police Department,
but a focusing event specific to the Police Department did not exist.
Budgetary concerns in Hazelwood also acted as policy promoter,
which caused the possibility of police contracting to rise higher on the
agenda. The impending closure of the Ford plant and the conjoined budget
issues also promoted other agenda items, such as an effort by City leaders to
find alternative revenue streams. City leaders also advocated Ford to
continue production in the City.
Change in Image and Venue
The views of residents and City leaders regarding the Police
Department’s professionalism and effectiveness were positive and that view
did not change. As one former member of the County Police command staff
stated, the consensus was that the department did their job (personal
interview, May 21, 2015). Residents supported the Department and were
willing to attend a City Council meeting to voice their support. The

127

individuals responsible for policies surrounding the Police Department did
not change. The City did not see a change in leaders prior to the contracting
discussion. The Mayor had served since 2000 and the police chief had served
for a little over fifteen years. While the County Police prepared a contract
proposal, the County was not asked to oversee or audit the existing municipal
police services.
Service Style
The long tenured Police Chief had built a professional department.
The Police Chief was a member of several professional policing organizations,
including the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). As one
prior City leader stated, the Chief was highly respected and aggressive in
establishing an effective police agency that excelled in community-oriented
policing (personal interview, November 20, 2015). The characteristics
described by the former City leader are consistent with the service style of
policing. In the service style, a reform police chief implements a standardized
set of procedures, focusing on serving the community through community
policing methods. In the service style, the police chief is responsive to the
needs of the community. The same City leader stated the Chief understood
the needs of the police and the community and that he would ask the Council
to provision the Police Department appropriately (personal interview,
November 20, 2015).
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Conclusion
In the case of Hazelwood, all three hypotheses were supported. The
contracting discussion was born out of concern for future revenue projections
related to the potential shuttering of the Ford plant. A focusing event specific
to the Police Department was lacking. A change in venue and image was also
lacking. The Department also displayed characteristics associated with the
service style of policing.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
St. Louis County is made-up of ninety municipalities that provide
police services both internally and through contractual agreements. The
purpose of this work was to examine police contracting decisions under the
lens of agenda setting and policy process theories. To study the issue, five St.
Louis County municipalities were examined. It was hypothesized that
successful contracting discussions would be preceded by a focusing event, a
change in image and venue, and that a legalistic or watchman police
department would be more likely to contract out than a department with a
service style.
Focusing Events
Different types of focusing events preceded the contracting discussions
in each municipality. Focusing events surrounding problems with the police
departments proceeded contracting in Fenton, Dellwood, and Jennings. In
Rock Hill and Hazelwood, focusing events proceeded the contracting
discussions, but the events centered around budgetary issues, not the police.
In Fenton, allegations of police misconduct presented a focusing event
during a time in which City leaders sought to implement police reforms
aimed to modernize the Police Department and increase professionalism. In
Jennings, two focusing events, one concerning corruptly gained grant funds
and the other surrounding the misapplication of deadly force served as
focusing events. In Dellwood, the focusing event centered on unprofessional
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conduct by the Dellwood Police Department, which was epitomized by
lackluster case investigations.
In Rock Hill and Hazelwood, the focusing event did not focus on the
police. Rock Hill’s budget issues were driven by proposals to build a civic
center that would have depleted dwindling resources. In Hazelwood,
concerns of future deficits were fueled by the announcement the Ford plant
was slated for closure.
These findings suggest that focusing events are necessary for the topic
of police contracting to make it to the agenda. For contracting to succeed, the
focusing event must focus attention on a problem or issue with the existing
police service. In instances where the focusing event raised police contracting
to the agenda, but was not specific to the police, the agenda item failed to
result in a police services contract.
Change in Image and Venue
A change in both image and venue were necessary for contracting to
occur in the case studies. Changes in image and venue result during periods
of policy destabilization. A change in image regarding the police provided a
new tone in which to discuss and evaluate existing police services and
alternatives. A change in venue often brought other individuals into the
discussion of policy issues surrounding the police.
In contracting discussions that ultimately led to contracting, there was
a change in image and venue with relation to the municipal police
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department. For example, in Fenton, one change in venue occurred when a
new city marshal was elected. A change in image occurred as the information
was made public that called into question the quality and professionalism of
the police department. In both Jennings and Dellwood, one change of venue
occurred when County police commanders were asked to oversee the existing
police departments. The image of the existing police agencies was also
changed as information related to the quality and professionalism of the
police department was made public. Contracting discussions in Rock Hill
and Hazelwood lacked a change in both image and venue.
Police Styles
Wilson’s police service styles were utilized to frame a discussion of
police agencies and practices that operate on the margins of professional
policing. It was hypothesized that police agencies displaying characteristics
associated with the legalistic and watchman styles of policing would have a
higher likelihood of contracting. While an in-depth analysis of the policing
culture and the accompanying style was not feasible for this analysis, an
assessment of policing styles was made based on interviews and public
documents. The municipalities that contracted police services in this study
displayed characteristics of unprofessional police behavior associated with
the watchman style as framed by Wilson. The dissolved agencies were often
described as “good ‘ol boy” departments. Discipline was uneven and
standardized policies in procedures were either not in place or overlooked.
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The agencies that were ultimately dissolved displayed characteristics of
police agencies operating at the margins. These practices often led to a
disconnect between the community and the police.
The municipal police departments that were dissolved in favor of
contracted police services displayed characteristics of the watchman style,
providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis. However, given the absence of
hard data on policing styles and the limited number of cases, more research
would be needed to fully test this hypothesis.
Policy Entrepreneurs
At the beginning of this research, the potential for policy entrepreneurs
and their role in the policy process was overlooked. While conducting
interviews and research, it became clear that policy entrepreneurs did play a
role in the policy process. In at least two of the case studies, Dellwood and
Jennings, the County Police acted as policy entrepreneurs. Policy
entrepreneurs invest resources into a problem in order to obtain a favorable
outcome. The County Police invested resources in the form of manpower,
agency audits, and patrol plans during contracting discussions. While the
municipalities offered to reimburse the County’s expenses for the assignment
of police commanders to oversee the Departments, the County had to shuffle
manpower at the command staff level to cover the assignments.
County Police members became key actors in the policy process,
particularly during audits of existing police departments. As seen in the
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cases of Dellwood and Jennings, the County Police audits resulted in negative
press regarding the departments. The introduction of the County Police also
resulted in a change in venue because the County Police could influence local
police policy and policy discussions surrounding the police. The introduction
of the County Police impacted both changes in venue and image.
Several interviewees pointed to respectable intentions by the County
Police when it came to matters of contracting. The motives of the County
Police to engage in contractual police services were often described as a
desire to provide a professional police service to municipal residents.
However, as seen in several articles, citizens and some elected leaders have
had concerns the County Police engage in “take-over” tactics during
contracting discussions. When the County Police act as policy entrepreneurs
there is the possibility for a conflict of interest. If the County Police can enter
the policy fray, thus changing the venue, and release negative information
about a department, changing the image, the County stands a better chance of
receiving a police services contract. The County therefore receives a benefit,
even if it is as minuscule as an increase to the number of full-time employees
allowed and an increase in the size of territory policed.
Findings and the Rational Choice Theory
One of the criticisms of rational choice theory in Chapter 3 was that the
theory could not fully explain police contracting decisions. From the rational
choice perspective, a municipality should contract police services if the
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municipality would save money and increase efficiency. While saving money
and achieving greater efficiency did play a role in contracting decisions, these
were not the only factors. In cases where contracting could have saved
money, such as Rock Hill, the municipality decided against contracting police
services. The rational choice perspective also assumes that participating
institutions are unitary rational actors. The participating institutions have a
number of actors inside the institutions who are behind the scenes working
their own agendas and policy levers to influence decisions. These actors can
drive the agenda, such as the introduction of policy entrepreneurs.
Feiock expanded the rational choice discussion to include matters of
context in decisions to collaborate between governments, a few of those
contextual factors are worth mentioning again in light of the research. One of
Feiock’s propositions was that characteristics with greater asset specificity are
least likely to experience collaborative efforts. Policing is asset specific
because police officers are familiar with the territory in which they function.
Citizen concerns about losing officers known to them were raised by citizens
in all of the case studies.
Feiock also theorized that community characteristics and political
structures would influence collaborative agreements. Utilizing the data
presented in Chapter 2, it was clear that several of these contextual factors did
not matter in the case of police contracting in St. Louis County. One of the
contextual theories was that demographic homogeneity increased
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collaborative agreements. However, in St. Louis County many racially
diverse municipalities contract police services (reference Table 2.5). Another
factor concerning political structure held that collaborative efforts would
increase with professional management. Yet, in St. Louis County, the
majority of municipalities contracting police services are not professionally
managed (reference Table 2.4).
The data and case studies suggest that rational calculations were not
enough to ensure contracting decisions. In both Rock Hill and Hazelwood
contracting police services from the County could have decreased costs and
increased efficiencies, yet these municipal police departments were retained.
In Fenton the cost savings of contracting were publicized, yet the underlying
causes of contracting were not rooted in cost savings and increased
efficiencies. In the cases presented, rational calculations related to costs and
efficiencies were not sufficient to bring about the decision to contract. In
these cases, there also needed to be a change in image and venue.
Changes in image and venue occur in a specific space in time. In the
case studies presented, these changes were preceded by focusing events. One
of the purposes of this work was to examine how theories from the policy
process literature could be applied to contracting decisions, particularly when
rational choice theories seemed to fall short. The majority of municipalities in
St. Louis County do not contract police services. In the County several
municipalities with small populations, which most assuredly could increase
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efficiencies, do not contract police services. The case studies suggest that for
contracting to occur there needs to be a perfect storm of events. Kingdon
describes this perfect storm of events as a policy window. A policy window
is only open for a short period of time and various actors must seize upon the
opportunity for action on a specific agenda item. Certainly, in the successful
contracting decisions, various policy participants were able to come together.
The need for these various events to occur and open a policy window
indicates the possibility that inefficient and unprofessional municipal police
agencies, that would benefit from contracting, will continue to exist.
The Future of Policing in St. Louis County
As discussed, the decision to contract police services does not always
occur out of need or rational basis. These contracting decisions need to be
combined with other events. The recent events and follow-up from the
incident in Ferguson, are redefining and reshaping the policing landscape in
St. Louis County. The follow-up has consisted of inquiries and reports by the
Department of Justice and the Ferguson Commission. The Missouri State
Legislature and the County Council have taken up the matter and passed
legislation that seeks to reduce unprofessional practices within the criminal
justice system in St. Louis County.
This work was started long before the events of Ferguson, but those
events cannot be overlooked. The hypotheses and conclusions of this work
can be applied to post-Ferguson policing in St. Louis County. Ferguson acted
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as a County wide focusing event on both municipal policing and municipal
court systems. Issues of professional policing and an examination of
alternatives to the status-quo St. Louis County municipal police system have
long been discussed by those concerned with matters of policing. However,
Ferguson thrust matters of municipal policing onto the agenda causing not
only those interested in police policies to examine the status-quo but others
outside of the day to day policy process.
The issues that have been laid bare by Ferguson show municipal police
agencies that operate at the margins of professionalism. These agencies often
display characteristics of the legalistic or watchman style of policing. Police
agencies operating at the margins are often joined by a larger criminal justice
system in which prosecutors and municipal courts enforce laws with a heavy
hand of fines, fees, and warrants. Over-policing and the severity of court
sentences are often targeted on outsiders and residents with low incomes. The
ArchCity Defenders report summarized this concern, “Overall…stopping,
charging and fining the poor and minorities…and by incarcerating people for
the failure to pay fines…unintentionally push the poor further into poverty”
(Harvey, et al., 2014). The operation of police agencies that feed upon
outsiders and residents with low incomes to increase revenues further
increases poverty and decreases the quality of life for a certain segment of
society.
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There has been a shift in policy venue and image in relation to
municipal police agencies in St. Louis County. The venue was greatly
expanded as the federal government, legislative bodies, government agencies,
and an appointed commission all began to examine police services in St.
Louis County. The image of municipal police agencies was forever changed.
Prior to Ferguson and immediately after, many small municipal police
agencies still exist and many have not made the necessary changes to increase
efficiency or professionalism. Contracting police services does not always
occur because of a rational need, which suggests that some incentive is
necessary to professionalize police services.
Incentives and encouragement to change the status-quo of policing
and the operations of municipal courts in St. Louis County has occurred in
Senate Bill 5 and in recent County legislation. Senate Bill 5 limited the
amount of revenue a municipality could collect from traffic fines. The Bill
also limited fines and jail sentences and provided guidelines related to court
costs. Municipalities were also required to submit an annual report to the
Missouri State Auditor detailing revenues from law enforcement actions.
Senate Bill 5 was one post-Ferguson change by the Missouri legislature to
upend the status-quo.
The St. Louis County Council, concerned about problems with
professionalism in municipal police agencies in the County went beyond the
Missouri legislature. In December of 2015, the County Council approved a
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measure requiring police departments in the County to meet a series of
baseline standards. The measure was supported by County Executive Steve
Stenger. Stenger stated that the measure’s main purpose was to ensure equal
access to quality law enforcement across the County (Giegerich 2015).
Departments were allowed six months to meet the standards set forth in the
bill or face fines or a County takeover. While the measure is currently being
contested in court, it demonstrates the attention local leaders are giving to
policing policies and the desire to change the business as usual attitude of
policing in St. Louis County.
Outside of St. Louis County and Missouri, national attention has been
turned to policing policies. After Ferguson and several other high-profile
events surrounding police in other parts of the county, President Barack
Obama called together the “Task Force on 21st Century Policing” to examine
issues of policing. In May of 2015, the Task Force released its report, which
featured six topics, or “pillars.” Those six pillars were: (1) building trust and
legitimacy, (2) policy and oversight, (3) technology and social media, (4)
community policing and crime reduction, (5) training and education, and (6)
officer wellness and safety. Key recommendations concerned an emphasis on
increasing peace officer training standards. The group also recommended
creating standards for hiring and education of police officers. Another key
finding of the group was to expand a database that maintained a list of
decertified police officers in an effort to keep officers who had been
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discharged due to a problem from becoming a police officer in another state
or another department.
Ferguson has created an environment that has led to the opening of a
policy window that is conducive to further contracting and collaborative
efforts. Based upon the findings of this study, future efforts of contracting
and collaborative efforts are to be expected in St. Louis County. A focusing
event and changes to both image and venue have occurred.
Limitations, Recommended Research, and Conclusion
The purpose of this work was to examine police contracting decisions
in St. Louis County, specifically the drivers behind contracting discussions
and decisions examined primarily under the lens of policy process theories.
This study was limited to five case studies, which represent only a small
sampling of municipalities in St. Louis County. The findings are insightful
and further our knowledge of contracting decisions and the policy process
behind those decisions. However, five case studies may not be representative
of all the cases of municipal contracting or those instances in which a
municipality would benefit from contracting.
The focus of this study was also specific to the St. Louis County
experience. St. Louis County is an extreme case of suburban fragmentation,
with a large number of small municipalities. The findings of this study may
not be generalizable to other areas or metropolitan areas with larger suburbs.
Due to the timing of this study and the focus on St. Louis County, the
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majority of individuals contacted for an interview failed to respond or
declined. Several cited potential litigation issues surrounding contract
decisions. Others, felt that the timing of the study was suspect and
questioned the integrity of any study focused on policing in the aftermath of
Ferguson. At least one potential interviewee cited a previous interview in
which the interviewee’s words were inserted into an article that displayed
bias (in the opinion of the potential interviewee).
Future research could certainly expand the foundation laid by this
work. Increasing the number of interviewees and the municipalities studied
could produce a broader picture of contracting decisions in St. Louis County.
A comparative study, utilizing examples from St. Louis County and other
regions where contracting is prevalent (e.g. King County, Washington and
Los Angeles County, California) could determine the generalizability of this
study.
The three case studies of successful police contracts were limited to
municipalities that have contracted with the St. Louis County Police. Further
research on municipalities that have only contracted with other municipal
governments would be beneficial. This research could compare and contrast
the differences and rationale behind decisions to contract with another
municipality versus the County.
Wilson’s policing styles were utilized to frame a discussion of police
professionalism in this study. Future studies could operationalize
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professionalism through an in-depth analysis of policies and procedures for
each department. The policies and procedures of each case study, both before
and after the contracting discussions, could be matched against national
standards as outlined by the Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA). Utilizing the standards recommended
by CALEA, the departments could be rated on levels of professionalism
based upon the existence of commonly accepted policies.
As the nature of policing in St. Louis County continues to evolve,
future studies should be completed, perhaps utilizing techniques described
above. Future research could further an understanding of the evolution of
policing in both America and in a highly fragmented metropolitan area after a
metropolitan-wide focusing event. Future research could also be expanded to
the policy process. Examining the policy streams and the policy window
opened after Ferguson would be insightful to both the policy process and
criminal justice arenas.
Despite the limitations of this study and areas for future research, this
study has expanded an understanding of police contracting decisions and the
ability to apply theories of the policy process to these decisions. The rational
choice models previously used to describe interjurisdictional agreements
posited that the participating institutions are unitary rational actors that
sought to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Feiock built upon this
foundation and proposed that context played an important role in
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interjurisdictional agreements. This study moved beyond that discussion,
utilizing theories from the policy process literature, to demonstrate the
importance of focusing events and the necessity for changes in image and
venue for contracting to occur.
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Tables
Table 2.1
Municipal Police Departments in St. Louis County
Ballwin
Eureka
Overland
Bel-Nor
Ferguson
Pacific
Bel-Ridge
Flordell Hills
Pagedale
Bella Villa
Florissant
Pine Lawn
Bellefontaine Neighbors
Frontenac
Richmond Heights
Berkeley
Glendale
Riverview
Beverly Hills
Hazelwood
Rock Hill
Breckenridge Hills
Hillsdale
St. Ann
Brentwood
Kinloch
St. John
Bridgeton
Kirkwood
Shrewsbury
Calverton Park
Ladue
Sunset Hills
Chesterfield
Lakeshire
Town & Country
Clayton
Manchester
University City
Country Club Hills
Maplewood
Velda City
Crestwood
Maryland Heights
Vinita Park
Creve Coeur
Moline Acres
Warson Woods
Des Peres
Edmundson
Ellisville

Normandy
Northwoods
Olivette

Webster Groves
Woodson Terrace
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Table 2.2
Municipalities Contracting Police Services in St. Louis County
Municipality
Police Service Provider
Bellerive
Normandy
Black Jack
St. Louis County
Champ
Maryland Heights
Charlack
Vinita Park (North County Police Coop.)
Clarkson Valley
St. Louis County
Cool Valley
Normandy
Country Life Acres
Town & Country
Crystal Lake Park
Frontenac
Dellwood
St. Louis County
Fenton
St. Louis County
Glen Echo Park
Normandy
Grantwood Village
St. Louis County
Green Park
St. Louis County
Greendale
Normandy
Hanley Hills
St. Louis County
Huntleigh
Frontenac
Jennings
St. Louis County
Mackenzie
Shrewsbury
Marlborough
St. Louis County
Norwood Court
St. Louis County
Oakland
Kirkwood
Pasadena Hills
St. Louis County
Pasadena Park
Normandy
Sycamore Hills
St. John
Twin Oaks
St. Louis County
Uplands Park
St. Louis County
Valley Park
St. Louis County
Velda Village Hills
Beverly Hills
Vinita Terrace
Vinita Park (North County Police Coop.)
Wellston
Vinita Park (North County Police Coop.)
Westwood
Frontenac
Wilbur Park
St. Louis County
Wildwood
St. Louis County
Winchester
St. Louis County
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Smallest 30 Municipalities

Table 2.3
St. Louis County Municipalities by Size
Middle 30 Municipalities

2010
Municipality
Contract*
Population Municipality
Champ
1
13 Lakeshire
Country Life Acres
1
74 Hillsdale
Mackenzie
1
134 Bel-Nor
Glen Echo Park
1
160 Winchester
Bellerive
1
188 Vinita Park
Vinita Terrace
1
277 Warson Woods
Westwood
1
278 Hanley Hills
Kinloch
0
298 Marlborough
Huntleigh
1
334 Wellston
Twin Oaks
1
392 Moline Acres
Uplands Park
1
445 Green Park
Crystal Lake Park
1
470 Clarkson Valley
Pasadena Park
1
470 Bel-Ridge
Wilbur Park
1
471 Riverview
Beverly Hills
0
574 Pine Lawn
Greendale
1
651 Pagedale
Sycamore Hills
1
668 Frontenac
Bella Villa
0
729 Fenton
Flordell Hills
0
822 Woodson Terrace
Edmundson
0
834 Northwoods
Grantwood Village
1
863 Rock Hill
Pasadena Hills
1
930 Breckenridge Hills
Norwood Court
1
959 Normandy
Velda Village Hills
1
1055 Dellwood
Cool Valley
1
1196 Glendale
Country Club Hills
0
1274 Shrewsbury
Calverton Park
0
1293 Saint John
Charlack
1
1363 Black Jack
Oakland
1
1381 Valley Park
Velda City
0
1420 Pacific
Police Contracts
22 of 30
73% Police Contracts
* 0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services

Contract*
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
10 of 30

2010
Population
1432
1478
1499
1547
1880
1962
2101
2179
2313
2442
2622
2632
2737
2856
3275
3304
3482
4022
4063
4227
4635
4746
5008
5025
5925
6254
6517
6929
6942
7002
33%

Largest 30 Municipalities
Municipality
Olivette
Maplewood
Brentwood
Des Peres
Sunset Hills
Ladue
Richmond Heights
Berkeley
Ellisville
Eureka
Town & Country
Bellefontaine Neighbors
Bridgeton
Crestwood
Saint Ann
Jennings
Clayton
Overland
Creve Coeur
Manchester
Ferguson
Webster Groves
Hazelwood
Maryland Heights
Kirkwood
Ballwin
University City
Wildwood
Chesterfield
Florissant
Police Contracts

Contract*
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2 of 30

2010
Population
7737
8046
8055
8373
8496
8521
8603
8978
9133
10189
10815
10860
11550
11912
13020
14712
15939
16062
17833
18094
21203
22995
25703
27472
27540
30404
35371
35517
47484
52158
7%
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Table 2.4
St. Louis County Municipalities by Professional Management
Not Professionally Managed
Professionally Managed
Contract* Municipality
Contract* Municipality
Contract*
0 Lakeshire
0 Ballwin
0
0 Mackenzie
1 Berkeley
0
0 Marlborough
1 Black Jack
1

Municipality
Bel-Nor
Bel-Ridge
Bella Villa
Bellefontaine
Neighbors
Bellerive
Beverly Hills
Breckenridge Hills

0
1
0
0

Moline Acres
Norwood Court
Oakland
Overland

0
1
1
0

Bridgeton
Calverton Park

0
0

Pagedale
Pasadena Hills

Champ
Clarkson Valley
Cool Valley
Country Life Acres
Crystal Lake Park
Edmundson
Flordell Hills
Florissant
Frontenac
Glen Echo Park

1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1

Grantwood Village
Green Park

1
1

Greendale
Hanley Hills
Hillsdale
Huntleigh
Jennings

1
1
0
1
1

Kinloch
Ladue

0
0

0
1
0
0

0
1

Brentwood
Charlack
Chesterfield
Clayton
Country Club
Hills
Crestwood

Pasadena Park
Pine Lawn
Riverview
Saint Ann
Sunset Hills
Sycamore Hills
Twin Oaks
Uplands Park
Valley Park
Velda City
Velda Village
Hills
Vinita Park

1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0

Creve Coeur
Dellwood
Des Peres
Ellisville
Eureka
Fenton
Ferguson
Glendale
Hazelwood
Kirkwood

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
0

0
0

Vinita Terrace
Warson Woods
Wellston
Westwood
Wilbur Park
Woodson
Terrace

1
0
1
1
1

Manchester
Maplewood
Maryland
Heights
Normandy
Northwoods
Olivette
Pacific
Richmond
Heights
Rock Hill
Saint John

0

Shrewsbury

0

Town & Country
University City
Webster Groves
Wildwood
Winchester

0
0
0
1
1

0

Police Contracts 28 of 55
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services

Police Contracts

0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

6 of 35
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Table 2.5
St. Louis County Municipalities by Racial Diversity
Predominantly Minority (<15% White)
Diverse
Municipality
Contract*
% White^ Municipality
Contract*
% White^
Velda Village Hills
1
0.9 Black Jack
1
16.3
Pine Lawn
0
1.5 Dellwood
1
18
Uplands Park
1
2 Normandy
0
21.3
Hillsdale
0
2.2 Vinita Terrace
1
22.7
Wellston
1
2.4 Bellefontaine Neighbors
0
25.7
Velda City
0
3 Riverview
0
27
Pagedale
0
3.4 Greendale
1
28
Kinloch
0
3.4 Pasadena Hills
1
28.1
Norwood Court
1
4.1 Ferguson
0
29.3
Beverly Hills
0
4.2 Vinita Park
0
30.1
Northwoods
0
4.3 Pasadena Park
1
35.1
Flordell Hills
0
5.8 Bel-Nor
0
48.7
Moline Acres
0
6.3 University City
0
50.8
Glen Echo Park
1
8.1 Calverton Park
0
53.4
Country Club Hills
0
8.2 Breckenridge Hills
0
53.5
Jennings
1
8.5 Bellerive
1
54.8
Cool Valley
1
11.8 Charlack
1
55.8
Hanley Hills
1
12 Edmundson
0
56.4
Bel-Ridge
0
14.2 Olivette
0
60.9
Berkeley
0
14.3 Hazelwood
0
64.1
Police Contracts
8 of 20
40%
Saint John
0
67.4
Woodson Terrace
0
68.5
Florissant
0
69.3
Saint Ann
0
69.5
Rock Hill
0
70.6
Bridgeton
0
72.4
Maryland Heights
0
73.2
Overland
0
73.3
Maplewood
0
74.1
Clayton
0
78
Creve Coeur
0
79.9
Marlborough
1
80
Richmond Heights
0
81.7
Sycamore Hills
1
82.8
Valley Park
1
85.1
Police Contracts
11 of 35
31%
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services ^Source: 2010 US Census Bureau Statistics

Predominantly White (>85% White)
Municipality
Contract*
% White^
Chesterfield
0
86.5
Brentwood
0
87.5
Manchester
0
87.6
Town & Country
0
87.8
Pacific
0
88.4
Ballwin
0
89.3
Kirkwood
0
89.4
Webster Groves
0
89.9
Frontenac
0
90.1
Shrewsbury
0
90.4
Huntleigh
1
91.3
Crystal Lake Park
1
91.5
Ellisville
0
91.7
Westwood
1
92.1
Wildwood
1
92.2
Green Park
1
92.5
Winchester
1
92.6
Bella Villa
0
92.6
Clarkson Valley
1
92.9
Lakeshire
0
93.7
Crestwood
0
93.8
Sunset Hills
0
94.1
Des Peres
0
94.3
Eureka
0
94.9
Fenton
1
95.5
Ladue
0
95.5
Country Life Acres
1
95.9
Wilbur Park
1
96.2
Oakland
1
96.2
Glendale
0
96.7
Twin Oaks
1
97.4
Warson Woods
0
97.9
Grantwood Village
1
99
Mackenzie
1
99.3
Champ
1
100
Police Contracts
15 of 35
43%
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Lower 1/3 in Household Income
Municipality
Kinloch
Normandy
Wellston
Hillsdale
Riverview
Bel-Ridge
Marlborough
Velda City
Pine Lawn
Pagedale
Country Club Hills
Flordell Hills
Jennings
Cool Valley
Berkeley
Vinita Park
Breckenridge Hills
Norwood Court
Velda Village Hills
Beverly Hills
Maplewood
Hanley Hills
Edmundson
Ferguson
Moline Acres
Woodson Terrace
Charlack
Northwoods
Saint Ann
Saint John
Police Contracts

Contract*
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
8 of 30

Median
Household
Income^
$19,231
$21,183
$23,836
$23,958
$25,885
$26,404
$27,150
$29,250
$29,570
$29,767
$29,821
$30,417
$30,656
$31,389
$31,745
$32,065
$32,312
$33,113
$33,214
$33,375
$35,067
$35,496
$36,827
$36,928
$37,000
$37,015
$37,796
$38,235
$39,343
$43,413
27%

Table 2.6
St. Louis County Municipalities by Household Income
Middle 1/3 in Household Income
Median
Household
Municipality
Contract*
Income^
Lakeshire
0
$44,000
Overland
0
$44,816
Shrewsbury
0
$45,709
Bella Villa
0
$47,969
Dellwood
1
$48,432
Uplands Park
1
$49,063
Hazelwood
0
$49,355
Bellefontaine Neighbors
0
$49,549
Vinita Terrace
1
$49,659
University City
0
$50,099
Florissant
0
$50,894
Pacific
0
$51,004
Sycamore Hills
1
$52,000
Calverton Park
0
$52,222
Greendale
1
$52,500
Mackenzie
1
$53,750
Bridgeton
0
$53,879
Winchester
1
$54,464
Black Jack
1
$54,903
Pasadena Park
1
$54,907
Maryland Heights
0
$55,643
Richmond Heights
0
$57,880
Valley Park
1
$58,378
Wilbur Park
1
$60,179
Crestwood
0
$62,860
Green Park
1
$63,164
Rock Hill
0
$65,438
Brentwood
0
$65,950
Twin Oaks
1
$66,429
Ellisville
0
$67,944
Police Contracts
13 of 30
43%

Top 1/3 in Household Income
Municipality
Kirkwood
Olivette
Manchester
Bel-Nor
Webster Groves
Glen Echo Park
Crystal Lake Park
Fenton
Oakland
Ballwin
Pasadena Hills
Clayton
Creve Coeur
Sunset Hills
Eureka
Chesterfield
Bellerive
Glendale
Grantwood Village
Warson Woods
Wildwood
Des Peres
Champ
Town & Country
Westwood
Frontenac
Ladue
Huntleigh
Clarkson Valley
Country Life Acres
Police Contracts

Contract*
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
13 of 30

Median
Household
Income^
$69,845
$70,050
$71,405
$72,679
$73,206
$76,875
$77,500
$78,074
$78,929
$79,484
$81,071
$83,940
$91,642
$91,957
$94,212
$96,367
$101,875
$102,237
$106,250
$110,156
$113,737
$117,431
$120,694
$135,900
$144,167
$147,917
$154,541
$173,750
$186,875
$212,500
43%

*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services ^2009 Median Household Income, Source: 2010 US Census Bureau Statistics; Not Adjusted for Inflation
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Table 2.7
St. Louis County Municipalities by Point of Sale vs. Pool Cities
Point of Sale Cities
Hybrid Cities
Pool Cities
Municipality
Contract*
Municipality
Contract*
Municipality
Contract*
Municipality
Berkeley
0 Ballwin
0 Bel-Nor
0 Lakeshire
Beverly Hills
0 Bridgeton
0 Bel-Ridge
0 Mackenzie
Breckenridge Hills
0 Crestwood
0 Bella Villa
0 Maryland Heights
Brentwood
0 Creve Coeur
0 Bellefontaine Neighbors
0 Moline Acres
Clayton
0 Des Peres
0 Bellerive
1 Normandy
Cool Valley
1 Ellisville
0 Black Jack
1 Northwoods
Edmundson
0 Eureka
0 Calverton Park
0 Norwood Court
Ferguson
0 Fenton
1 Champ
1 Oakland
Frontenac
0 Hazelwood
0 Charlack
1 Pagedale
Ladue
0 Kirkwood
0 Chesterfield
0 Pasadena Hills
Maplewood
0 Manchester
0 Clarkson Valley
1 Pasadena Park
Marlborough
1 Pacific
0 Country Club Hills
0 Pine Lawn
Olivette
0 Sunset Hills
0 Country Life Acres
1 Riverview
Overland
0 Town & Country
0 Crystal Lake Park
1 Saint John
Richmond Heights
0 Twin Oaks
1 Dellwood
1 Sycamore Hills
Rock Hill
0 Valley Park
1 Flordell Hills
0 University City
Saint Ann
0 Police Contracts
3 of 16
Florissant
0 Uplands Park
Shrewsbury
0
Glen Echo Park
1 Velda City
Warson Woods
0
Glendale
0 Velda Village Hills
Woodson Terrace
0
Grantwood Village
1 Vinita Park
Police Contracts
2 of 20
Green Park
1 Vinita Terrace
Greendale
1 Webster Groves
Hanley Hills
1 Wellston
Hillsdale
0 Westwood
Huntleigh
1 Wilbur Park
Jennings
1 Wildwood
Kinloch
0 Winchester
Police Contracts
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services

Contract*
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
29 of 54
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Charts

Chart 2.1
Type I Crimes St. Louis County
2001 - 2014
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Source: Missouri State Highway Patrol, Uniform Crime Reporting
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GLENDALE
MANCHESTER
BALLWIN
WEBSTER GROVES
NORTHWOODS
CHESTERFIELD
BELLEFONTAINE NEIGHBORS
FLORISSANT
ROCK HILL
LAKESHIRE
BEL-RIDGE
RIVERVIEW
UNIVERSITY CITY
CRESTWOOD
ELLISVILLE
BRECKENRIDGE HILLS
FERGUSON
WARSON WOODS
SAINT JOHN
BERKELEY
SAINT ANN
KIRKWOOD
PACIFIC
BEL-NOR
OVERLAND
MOLINE ACRES
SUNSET HILLS
HAZELWOOD
SHREWSBURY
OLIVETTE
EUREKA
VELDA CITY
HILLSDALE
PAGEDALE
WOODSON TERRACE
CREVE COEUR
CLAYTON
MARYLAND HEIGHTS
TOWN & COUNTRY
NORMANDY
CALVERTON PARK
BRIDGETON
MAPLEWOOD
BELLA VILLA
BRENTWOOD
LADUE
RICHMOND HEIGHTS
COUNTRY CLUB HILLS
PINE LAWN
DES PERES
FRONTENAC
EDMUNDSON

$184.06
$185.75
$189.24
$190.68
$200.59
$202.31
$202.56
$207.04
$211.91
$224.39
$224.50
$226.14
$229.82
$232.12
$253.49
$255.74
$260.22
$260.90
$264.92
$265.18
$265.25
$265.70
$271.15
$281.79
$297.01
$307.00
$307.67
$308.21
$320.13
$327.42
$339.00
$342.32
$349.12
$361.55
$381.72
$381.86
$383.31
$388.21
$390.67
$412.00
$454.47
$465.19
$467.83
$469.88
$473.69
$525.79
$540.61
$544.27
$591.78
$730.77
$801.41

PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES

$1,137.79

CHART 2.2 - 2015 PER CAPITA POLICE EXPENDITURES
(AS REPORTED TO BETTER TOGETHER)

MUNICIPALITY
SOURCE: US CENSUS BUREAU AND BETTER TOGETHER
(NOT ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION)

153

Chart 5.1
City of Fenton Population 1940-2010
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Chart 5.2
City of Fenton Demographics 1980-2010
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Chart 5.3
City of Fenton Budget
Revenues & Expenditures, FY's 2011-2015
$5,800,000.00

$5,600,000.00

Budgeted Amount

$5,400,000.00

$5,200,000.00

Revenues

$5,000,000.00

Expenditures
$4,800,000.00

$4,600,000.00

$4,400,000.00
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Fiscal Year
Source: City of Fenton
(Not Adjusted for Inflation)
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Chart 5.4
City of Fenton Budget
Percent of General Expenditures Dedicated to Police
Serivces, FY's 1993 - 1997
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Chart 5.5
City of Fenton Budget
Percent of General Expenditures Dedicated to Police
Services, FY's 2011 - 2015
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Chart 5.6
Per Capita Reported UCR Crime, 2004-2014
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159

Chart 6.1
City of Jennings Population 1950-2010
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Chart 6.2
City of Jennings Demographics 1950-2010
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Chart 6.3
City of Jennings Budget
Revenues & Expenditures, FY's 2011-2015
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Chart 6.4
City of Jennings Budget
Percent of General Expenditures Dedicated to Public
Safety/Police Services, FY's 2009- 2015
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Chart 6.5
Per Capita Reported UCR Crime, 2004-2014
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Chart 7.1
City of Dellwood Population 1960-2010
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Chart 7.2
City of Dellwood Demographics 1960-2010
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Chart 7.3
City of Dellwood Budget
Revenues & Expenditures, FY's 2011-2015
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Chart 7.4
Per Capita Reported UCR Crime, 2004-2014
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Chart 8.1
City of Rock Hill Population 1940-2010
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Chart 8.2
City of Rock Hill Demographics 1940-2010
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Chart 8.3
City of Rock Hill Budget
Revenues & Expenditures, FY's 2011-2015
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Chart 8.4
City of Rock Hill Budget
Revenues & Expenditures, FY's 2002-2006
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Chart 8.5 Per Capita Reported UCR Crime, 2004-2014
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Chart 9.1
City of Hazelwood Population 1950-2010
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Chart 9.2
City of Hazelwood Demographics 1960-2010
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Chart 9.3
City of Hazelwood Budget
Revenues & Expenditures, FY's 2011-2015
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Chart 9.4
Per Capita Reported UCR Crime, 2004-2014
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